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This dissertation consists of three coherent chapters that discuss the capital structure target, speed 
of adjustment and effect of speed of adjustment on credit risk.  
Ⅰ: We standardize leverage ratio by underlying business risk. The methodology of 
standardization follows the assumption that asset value follows a geometric Brownian motion. 
We find that by standardizing book leverage ratio, standardized leverage ratio can be explained 
by firm characteristics with a much larger coefficient of determination compared with book 
leverage ratio. The coefficient of determination difference of regression with standardized 
leverage ratio and book leverage ratio becomes even larger if we exclude zero debt firms from 
our sample. These results suggest firms more likely target at the standardized leverage instead of 
the book leverage ratio. We also discuss the methodologies of estimating target standardized 
leverage ratio. Target standardized leverage ratio is estimated in both of Fama and French (2002) 
approach and Hovakimian and Li (2012)’s historical panel firm fixed effect approach. 
Ⅱ: Firms on average adjust to their target standardized leverage ratio at a much higher speed 
compared with the speed they adjust to the target book leverage. This result further supports our 
argument in Chapter 1 that firms more likely target at the standardized leverage ratio. In addition 
to calculating the average speed of adjustment, we calculate firm specific speed of adjustment by 
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implementing partial adjustment regression on each firm’s historical capital structure time series 
on the rolling window base. Firm individual speed of adjustment is shown to have significant 
predictive power on future capital structure adjustment. We also study the determinants of speed 
of adjustment. Larger size and lower price to book ratio firms tend to have larger speed of 
adjustment. Short term variables like past stock return, recent debt trend can also affect the 
instantaneous capital structure adjustment behavior.  
Ⅲ: We show how firm specific speed of adjustment affects Credit Spreads. To our knowledge, 
we are the first to empirically test how speed of adjustment affects credit risk. In addition to 
confirm previous empirical results that target standardized leverage affects credit risk along with 
standardized leverage ratio, we show that speed of adjustment significantly affects Credit 
Spreads. Larger speed of adjustment reduces credit risk on average and the effect is 
economically significant. We also study the second order effect of speed of adjustment on credit 
risk. Firm’s credit risk depends more on speed of adjustment when firm is highly leveraged. 
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Chapter 1: Target Capital Structure 
1.1 Introduction 
This Chapter constructs the standardized leverage measure by considering the variations of 
firms’ underlying business risk. Our empirical results show that, firms more likely target at the 
standardized leverage ratio instead of book leverage ratio. We therefore propose the estimation 
method of target standardized leverage ratio. Standardized leverage ratio is better distributed and 
can explain CDS spreads better than book leverage ratio.  
Leverage defined as debt to asset ratio (or its transformation) essentially measures the 
capability of the firm to meet its debt obligation, or credit risk. A high debt to asset ratio 
indicates a larger probability that the firm may default on its debt. However, credit risk comes 
from the interaction of leverage ratio and business risk. If a firm has zero business risk, which 
means this firm can make a certain rate of return over asset, then this firm would never default 
no matter how large of its debt to asset ratio as long as its asset return can cover the debt interest 
expense. Hence, leverage ratio defined as debt to asset ratio is not comparable across firm and 
time given the variation of underlying business risk. This motivates us to propose a standardized 
leverage measure which can consider the variation of underlying business risk. The standardized 
leverage ratio is a fairer measure of assessing credit risk compared with book leverage ratio. 
We create the standardized leverage ratio by assuming asset value follows a geometric 
Brownian motion and debt amount remains stable. The resulted standardized leverage is 
calculated as the expected value of logarithm leverage at time T in the future scaled by the 
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corresponding volatility. The form of standardized leverage is very similar to Merton’s Distance 
to Default measure. Different from Merton’s DD measure, we believe that even zero debt firms 
can default in the future. We therefore make a linear transformation on current debt to asset ratio 
to make it a non-zero variable without changing the cross-sectional rank of debt to asset ratio. 
The standardized leverage measure is nicely distributed and closer to normal distribution 
compared with book leverage distribution. Standardized leverage can also explain CDS spreads 
for much higher Coefficient of determination compared with book leverage ratio. 
We implement the capital structure determination test on book leverage and standardized 
leverage ratio. To do so, we regress book leverage ratio and standardized leverage ratio 
separately on eight variables that have been identified as important determinants of capital 
structure cross-sectionally. Coefficients of standardized leverage regression give us insights 
about firms’ behavior of taking credit risk. The Coefficient of determination of standardized 
leverage regression is much higher than the book leverage regression. Especially when we drop 
zero debt observations, Coefficient of determination of standardized leverage determination 
regression is more than double of Coefficient of determination of book leverage regression. 
These empirical results suggest that standardized leverage might be a better target capital 
structure measure compared with book leverage ratio. We also find that, firms on average 
converge to the “target standardized leverage” at a much faster speed compared with book 
leverage ratio. The results are presented in Chapter 2. 
Based on the proposition that standardized leverage is likely a better target capital structure 
measure, we mimic the methods of target book leverage estimation and suggest the estimation 
method for standardized leverage estimation. Following Hovakimian and Li (2012), we discuss 
the popular target leverage estimation methods used in previous literature. We suggest not 
3 
 
including future information while estimating target capital structure at each time point. The 
target standardized leverage can be estimated either by following Fama French (2002) or 
Hovakimian and Li (2012). 
Actually, standardized leverage ratio is not new to us. Capital Adequacy Ratio is indeed a 
standardized leverage measure in banking industry. Basel Accord 1988 firstly discusses the 
necessity of standardized leverage ratio. Basel Accord 1988 states that: “It provides a fairer basis 
for making international comparisons between banking systems whose structures may differ. It 
does not deter banks from holding liquid or other assets which carry low risk”. Capital Adequacy 
Ratio is the leverage ratio for Banking industry standardized by the underlying assets’ credit risk. 
Standardized leverage ratio for banking industry is now used by most of regulators and investors 
for measuring banks’ leveraging behavior and solvency risk. 
The remaining of this Chapter is organized as below: Section 1.2 discusses the standardized 
leverage measure construction. Section 1.3 describes the source of data and summary statistics of 
related variables. Section 1.4 shows the results of capital structure determination regressions. 
Section 1.5 discusses the estimation method of target standardized leverage ratio. Section 1.6 
concludes Chapter 1. 
 
1.2 Methodology of Standardizing Leverage Ratio 
Given a certain debt level (face value of total debt), assuming asset value follows a specific 
process in the future, firm defaults when its asset value goes below the debt level at the maturity. 
Equivalently, firm defaults when its book leverage goes above one at the maturity. Under this 
frame work of constant debt, variation of business risk plays its role by generating various asset 
4 
 
process or various leverage process. Therefore, the discussion of standardizing leverage ratio 
should start from the assumption of asset value dynamics. We follow the assumption of asset 
dynamic process from Merton 74 which assumes asset value follows geometric Brownian 
motion:         
 𝑑𝐴𝑡 = 𝜇 𝐴𝑡𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝐴𝑡𝑑𝑊𝑡 (1) 
Equation (1) assumes the instantaneous return of asset value follows a normal distribution 
with annualized mean return 𝜇 and annualized standard deviation 𝜎. Over the long horizons, 
asset value follows log normal distribution and the logarithm of asset value follows normal 
distribution. Given the assumption of constant debt, the logarithm leverage ratio denoted as 𝑙𝑡 
( 𝑙𝑡 = ln (
𝐷
𝐴𝑡
) ) then follows the process as below: 
 𝑑𝑙𝑡 = (
1
2
𝜎2 − 𝜇) 𝑑𝑡 − 𝜎𝑑𝑊𝑡 (2) 
Notice that, the sign of the drift term of Equation (2) is uncertain. Asset volatility increases 
the drift term and 𝜇 decreases the drift term of logarithm leverage process. By Ito’s Lemma and 
taking integration of Equation (2), the logarithm of leverage at maturity T follows the 
distribution as below: 
 𝑙𝑇 ∼ 𝜙(𝑙𝑡 + (
1
2
𝜎2 − 𝜇) 𝜏, 𝜎2𝜏) (3) 
Where 𝜙(⋅) stands for normal distribution, 𝜏 = 𝑇 − 𝑡, and 𝑙𝑡 denotes the logarithm leverage 
ratio at time t, 𝑙𝑇 denotes the logarithm leverage ratio at time T. As shown above, the geometric 
Brownian motion assumption of asset value generates a well-defined future logarithm leverage 








 𝑆𝐷[𝑙𝑇] = 𝜎√𝜏 (5) 
Theoretically, firm is regarded as default when leverage ratio goes above 1 or logarithm 
leverage ratio reaches 0. Standardized leverage ratio can hence be calculated as number of 
standard deviations the expected logarithm leverage ratio is away from the default point (𝑙𝑇 =
0). The standardized leverage ratio which is denoted as 𝑆𝐷𝐿 can then be calculated as: 
 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑀 =






Where the subscript M of  𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑀 means this standardized leverage is calculated under the 
assumption of Merton model. The nominator of standardized leverage ratio equals to the 
expected value of 𝑙𝑇 and the denominator equals the standard deviation of 𝑙𝑇. The default point is 
zero and is omitted from the expression. Notice that, 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑀 is exact the same as negative 𝑑2 in 
Black Scholes model or negative Merton Distance to Default measure. Hence, Merton Distance 
to Default measure is the standardized leverage under Merton’s assumptions. 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑀 positively 
correlates with book leverage ratio. Larger or higher 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑀 denotes larger credit risk which is 
consistent with the understanding of leverage ratio. 
 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑀 is a good candidate of standardized leverage ratio since it not only considers the 
variation of underlying business risk but also can be expressed by a simple formula which is easy 
to be executed. Under Merton’s assumption, firm would have infinite negative standardized 
leverage if D equals to 0, which means firm would have zero credit risk as long as its current 
debt equals zero. This assumption is not reasonable. On one hand, zero debt firm can possibly 
take debt in the future. In our sample, the total number of observations is 106163. Among these 
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annual observations, 14716 observations have zero debt. For these zero debt observations, results 
from first two columns of Table 1.1 show that the mean leverage ratio of one year in the future is 
2.64%, the mean leverage of two years in the future is 4.68%. hence, zero debt firm should not 
be regarded as credit risk free. On the other hand, the purpose of assessing the credit risk for a 
zero-debt firm is to help potential creditors to decide whether taking the newly issued debt or 
not. So, we should calculate the marginal credit risk the firm would incur if the debt level change 
from zero to positive. 
We propose an alternative method of standardizing leverage ratio by making modification 
about Merton’s assumption that zero debt firm has zero credit risk. Instead of using the current 
debt to asset ratio while standardizing leverage ratio, we use the modified debt to asset ratio by 
making linear transformation on the current debt asset ratio. The formula of linear transformation 
is determined by implementing the following one-year predicted leverage regression cross-
sectionally: 
 𝐿𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 × 𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 (7) 
The estimated coefficient can help us to get the expected debt to asset ratio ?̅? by imposing a 
linear transformation on current debt to asset ratio. The only explanatory variable of above 
equation is firm’s current leverage; hence this linear transformation would not alter the cross-
sectional ranking of current debt to asset ratio. Notice that the modified debt to asset ratio is non-
zero as long as the estimated alpha in Equation (7) is positive. All Equation (7) does is to shrink 
the cross-sectional debt to asset ratio to the mean. The modified debt to asset ratio at time t (𝐿?̅?) 
can then be calculated as: 
 𝐿?̂? = 𝛼 + 𝛽 × 𝐿𝑡 (8) 
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By replacing 𝐿𝑡 by 𝐿?̂? in Equation (6), we can then get a general form of standardized 
leverage formula as below: 
 
𝑆𝐷𝐿𝐺 =








Notice that Merton way of leverage standardization 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑀 is a special case of 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝐺  by 
having 𝛼 = 0 and 𝛽 = 1. The general form of leverage standardization keeps the spirit of 
Merton’s frame work and improves Merton’s standardized leverage by allowing positive credit 
risk for zero debt firms. 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝐺  is an increasing function of current debt to asset ratio and business 
risk. 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝐺  is theoretically unbounded on two sides. 
The calculation of  𝑆𝐷𝐿𝐺 requires the inputs of parameters 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝐿𝑡, 𝜇, 𝜎, and 𝜏. Where 𝐿𝑡 
stands for the current debt to asset ratio (book leverage ratio). 𝜎 denotes the business risk. Since 
business risk is not observable, we have to calculate it from equity volatility. We estimate firm 
individual equity volatility by calculating the realized stock return volatility on the past one-year 
time series. Business risk is then estimated as 𝜎 = 𝜎𝐸 × (1 − 𝐿). Where 𝜎𝐸 denotes realized 
equity volatility. For simplicity, we assume the drift of asset process as zero (𝜇 = 0). 𝛼 and 𝛽 are 
estimated by implementing cross-sectional regression as column (3) and column (4) of Table 1.1. 
Column (3) and Column (4) of Table 1.1 report the results of regressing 𝐿𝑡+1 and 𝐿𝑡+2 on 𝐿𝑡 and 
constant term respectively. Two pairs of candidates of 𝛼 and 𝛽 can be determined from the 
estimated coefficients: (𝛼 = 0.0304, 𝛽 = 0.895) and (𝛼 = 0.0533, 𝛽 = 0.800).  Parameter 𝜏 
only exist in the theoretical world. In Merton’s model, 𝜏 stands for the time to maturity of a firm. 
At the maturity date, debt holders take the minimum of the debt principal and the total asset 
value, the shareholders take whatever is left. 𝜏 does not exist in the real world and is therefore 
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not observable. Mathematically, 𝜏 determines the weights of debt to asset ratio and underlying 
business risk while standardizing leverage ratio. Longer 𝜏 makes standardized leverage more 
sensitive to the change of business risk and less sensitive to the change of debt to asset ratio. For 
simplicity, we set 𝜏 = 5 arbitrarily. The choice of 𝜏 does not change any of our main conclusions 
in the dissertation. In fact, larger 𝜏 can make the distribution of standardized leverage more 
symmetric. The choice of alpha and beta in Equation (9) depends on their empirical performance 
on explaining logarithm CDS spreads. We implement a cross-sectional regression of logarithm 
CDS spreads on 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝐺 with different pairs of alpha and beta. Pair of parameters that can generate 
the largest Coefficient of determination are used for the remaining of my dissertation. For 
brevity, the procedure of finding parameters is omitted. The final parameters we take are  𝛼 =
0.0304, 𝛽 = 0.895. Choice of alpha and beta does not affect our main conclusions. 
 
1.3 Summary Statistics 
 Our initial sample of Chapter 1 is drawn from Annual COMPUSTAT file covering from 
year 1989 to 2016. We exclude observations if the minimum book value of size or sales of a firm 
is smaller than 1 million. To minimize the effect of outliers and misreported observations, we 
truncate the sample at 1% level one two sides for variables Size, Tangibility, Market-to-Book, 
R&D, Profitability and Depreciation. Financial firms are also excluded from our sample (SIC 
codes 6000-6999). Firm size is measured by the logarithm of inflation adjusted book value of 
asset. Our mean profitability is lower than samples of Hovakimian and Li (2012) because our 
profitability measure has not been adjusted by depreciation (Hovakimian and Li (2012) adds 
depreciation back to profitability to measure firms’ capability of making profit). The resulted 
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sample contains 82320 firm-year observations. Along with the summary statistics of seven firm 
individual characteristics, Table 1.1 reports the summary statistics of book leverage and 
standardized leverage ratio. R&D is set as zero for missing value. Since firms with non-missing 
R&D may differ from firms with missing R&D, we set R&D dummy (RDD) as one if firm has 
non-missing R&D and zero otherwise. Standardized leverage ratio has less observations (72823) 
since the calculation of standardized leverage requires the input of stock volatility from CRSP 
database and part of COMPUSTAT firms are not merged with stock volatility (CRSP) 
successfully. The summary statistics in Table 1.1 shows that characteristics of our sample are 
similar to sample used in previous literature. 
 
1.4 Determination of Capital Structure 
In this subsection, we present the results of capital structure determination regressions for 
both of book leverage ratio and standardized leverage ratio. We implement two sets of 
regressions with dependent variable as book leverage ratio and standardized leverage ratio 
respectively. We include eight explanatory variables in the capital structure determination 
regressions. All of these explanatory variables are popularly used in previous empirical studies of 
capital structure. Explanatory variables include logarithm of inflation adjusted total asset, 
tangibility, market to book ratio, R&D, R&D dummy, return over asset, depreciation and 
industry median leverage ratio (or industry median standardized leverage ratio). Definition of 
these explanatory variables are presented at Appendix. 
We implement the cross-sectional capital structure determination regression to show how 
identified firm features affect different capital structure measure and how well different capital 
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structure measure can be explained by these firm and industry characteristics. The dependent 
variables are book leverage and standardized leverage respectively. Equation (10) is the popular 
regression which has been tested by many previous capital structure studies. Book leverage ratio 
at year t+1 is regressed on eight characteristics at year t cross-sectionally. Equation (11) tests the 
determination of standardized leverage by mimicking the form of Equation (10). Standardized 
leverage ratio at year t+1 is regressed on the firm characteristics and industry median capital 
structure measure in Equation (11). 
 𝐿𝑡+1 = 𝑋𝑡𝛽 + 𝜂𝑡 (10) 
                                                      𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡+1 = 𝑋𝑡𝛾 + 𝜔𝑡 (11) 
As we discussed in the subsection 1.2, standardized leverage ratio represents credit risk 
more closely. Researchers should be careful about the interpretation of estimated coefficients in 
Equation (10) and Equation (11). Coefficients of Equation (10) can only be interpreted as how 
these factors affect firm’s debt taking behavior and coefficients of Equation (11) can be 
interpreted as how firm characteristics affect risk taking behavior. Debt taking and risk taking are 
correlated but not identical. The interpretation of coefficients in Equation (10) is not identical to 
coefficients in Equation (11) even if we add the control variable “business risk” in Equation (10) 
since multiplicative effect cannot be replaced by additive effect. Both of Equation (10) and 
Equation (11) can generate useful insights as long as we can interpret these estimated 
coefficients correctly. 
For the results of Equation (10) and Equation (11), we should also pay attention to the 
coefficient of determination (𝑅2). Since we believe coefficient of determination is a good tester 
for finding the capital structure measure that firms more likely target at. Let us suppose we have 
two candidate capital structure measures, one is true and the other one is fake. Suppose that the 
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eight explanatory variables are the complete and true determinants of firms’ target capital 
structure and firms adjust to their target capital structure at a certain positive speed. Then the true 
capital structure measure should have larger coefficient of determination for determination 
regressions as Equation (10) and Equation (11). Although the eight explanatory variables are 
certainly not complete determinants of target capital structure and the possibility that neither of 
the two capital structure measures is true, the coefficient of determination still shows which 
capital structure measure is closer to the true target measure. 
Table 1.3 presents the baseline results. Column (3) and (4) include the full set of eight 
explanatory variables. Column (1) and (2) include firm individual characteristics only (exclude 
industry median capital structure measure). Column (1) and Column (3) replicate the regressions 
that have been implemented by many previous studies. Larger firms with more tangible assets 
tend to take higher debt to asset ratio. High market to book ratio, high depreciation and profitable 
firms with higher expenses on research and development tend to take less debt. Signs of 
coefficients of standardized leverage regressions which explains firms’ risk-taking behavior are 
not same as book leverage regression results. From previous empirical studies, it is well known 
that larger firm tend to have more debt. Trade off theory believes that larger firms can better take 
advantage of the tax shield of debt financing and reduce the probability of default and yields, 
therefore, a lower expected cost of bankruptcy. Large firms are safer in terms of more mature 
business and less volatile cash flow. It’s also easier for large firms to get financing. Larger firms 
on average have lower business risk and therefore they can afford larger debt portion. We get 
negative coefficients of firm size for standardized leverage regression in Column (2) and (4) of 
Table 1.3. The negative coefficients of firm size suggest that, although larger firm on average 
take more debt, these large firms are actually target at lower credit risk. The coefficient of firm 
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size for two regressions are not contradicted. Positive sign for book leverage regression suggest 
that large firms who have low business risk tend to take higher debt ratio. Negative sign for 
standardized leverage regression means, although larger firm has higher debt ratio, large firms 
tend to take less standardized leverage or less credit risk. 
Besides asset size, some other firm characteristics also consistently affect firms’ choices of 
standardized leverage ratio. Firms with more growth opportunities (high market to book ratio) 
tend to take less standardized leverage. Growth opportunities are capital assets that can only be 
realized if firms can take the “opportunities” in the future. Hence, high growth firms may choose 
to maintain a low standardized leverage and ready for getting easier and cheaper financing in the 
future. High R&D firms are believed to have more growth opportunity and larger business risk. 
Hence, firms with more research and development expense tend to have lower standardized 
leverage which is the same as the sign of book leverage ratio regression. In trade off theory, 
profitable firms should have the incentive to take more debt since profitable firms have larger 
need for tax shield. However, the empirical results are not the same as the theory. Empirical 
results constantly show that profitable firms indeed take lower debt to asset ratio (Hovakimian, 
Opler and Titman (2001)). We get similar results for the standardized leverage determination 
regression for Column (2) and Column (4) of Table 1.3. Profitable firms on average choose 
lower standardized leverage ratio which means firms which are capable to make strong earnings 
tend to take lower credit risk. 
The interpretation of coefficients for book leverage determination regression is convoluted 
especially when the explanatory variable is highly correlated with firm’s business risk. For 
example, the main reason that researchers get positive sign for firm size in Equation (10) is firm 
size is a good proxy of business risk. larger size firms on average have lower business risk and 
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can therefore afford higher debt to asset ratio. However, this result fails to capture the behavior 
of large size firm since large firms indeed take less risk instead of more risk (Column (2) and (4) 
from Table 1.3). The negative effect which is the “true size effect” is overwhelmed by business 
risk effect. If the research purpose is to understand firms’ risk-taking behavior, then without 
standardization, book leverage determination regression may generate confusing results. 
Previous studies mostly implement the target determination regression on the whole 
COMPUSTAT sample. The positive coefficient of firm size seems to be quite robust. However, 
if we implement the same test on a specific sub-sample, results can be different. Flannery, 
Nikolova and Öztekin (2012) implement the leverage determination regression and the results 
are shown in Table A1. They estimate the following OLS regression: 
 𝐿𝑡+1 = 𝜆 × (𝛽 ⋅ 𝑋𝑡) + (1 − 𝜆) × 𝐿𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡+1 (12) 
As long as the average speed of adjustment is positive, we should expect a positive 
coefficient on firm size based on results from previous studies. Instead of estimating target 
leverage on the whole COMPUSTAT sample, they implement the above regression on the 
sample of 394 bond issuers from 1973 to 2006. Column (3) shows the resulted sign for logarithm 
firm asset is significant negative which contradicts to common knowledge. Their Column (1) and 
(2) still show positive sign for firm size, but the coefficient is economically quite small.   
To address the issue that book leverage determination may generate convoluted results, we 
implement cross-sectional regression for Equation (10) and Equation (11) on the sub-sample of 
firms that ever have CDS contracts issued. Table 1.4 presents the same book leverage cross-
sectional regression results. Column (1) reports the results of book leverage regression. 
Surprisingly, the sign of firm size change from positive to significant negative. While the sign of 
firm size of standardized leverage regression (Column (2)) keep unchanged as negative. Larger 
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firms take more debt is one of the most important common senses from previous literature. This 
common knowledge is not hold in the sub-sample that have CDS contracts outside. The negative 
sign of firm size is not only significant statistically, but also economically. Notice that the 
coefficient of firm size in Column (1) of Table 1.3 is 0.021, and the coefficient of firm size in 
Column (1) of Table 1.4 is -0.013. The sample for firms that have CDS issued outside are quite 
different from the over-all COMPUSTAT sample. CDS sample on average has much larger firm 
size. The mean logarithm firm size for entire COMPUSTAT sample is 5.143 while the mean 
logarithm size for CDS sample is 7.62. CDS sample also has larger mean ROA of 10.5% (versus 
5.8% of entire sample) and higher tangible asset ratio of 37.4% (versus 30.7% of entire sample). 
Intuitively, firms in CDS sample tend to have much lower business risk because of the much 
larger in size, profitability and tangibility. Numerically, the equity implied business risk equals 
24.7% for CDS sample and equals 46.0% for entire sample. Since the business risk is well 
controlled by the CDS sample, the “true size effect” appears to be significant in this special 
sample.  
Alternatively, we also implement Equation (12) separately for entire sample and CDS 
sample in order to study the sign of how firm size affects capital structure. Table 1.5 shows the 
comparison results. Column (1) and Column (2) report the coefficients of the one-step regression 
for book leverage ratio and standardized leverage ratio respectively for the entire COMPUSTAT 
sample. We get positive significant coefficient for firm size in Column (1) and negative 
significant coefficient in Column (2). These results are consistent with results in Table 1.4. 
Column (3) and Column (4) of Table 1.5 shows the coefficients for CDS sample. The coefficient 
of firm size change into negative marginal significant (t=-1.41) for Column (3) and the 
coefficient for firm size remains significant negative in Column (4). These results confirm our 
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conclusion in Table 1.4 that the interpretation of coefficients is not clear for book leverage 
determination regression.  
Coefficients of determination of leverage determination regressions (Equation (10) and 
Equation (11)) are important since it suggests which one is more likely to be the true target 
capital structure measure. Suppose firms indeed target at the true capital structure measure at 
some speed, then the variable that is more correlated with the true capital structure measure 
should get larger coefficient of determination (𝑅2) for capital structure determination regression. 
Table 1.3 reports the Coefficient of determination for book leverage and standardized leverage. 
Column (1) and (2) include firm individual characteristics only. Book leverage regression has 𝑅2 
of 21.0% (Column (1)) while standardized leverage ratio regression has 𝑅2 of 31.7% which is 
about 47% higher than book leverage regression. Column (3) and Column (4) show similar 
comparison by including industry median capital structure into the regressions. The difference of 
𝑅2 for Column (3) and Column (4) is quite significant (23.0% versus 25.2%). 
Difference of coefficient of determination for two capital structure measures is even larger 
if we drop the zero debt observations. It has been documented that about 15% of observations in 
COMPUSTAT have zero book leverage ratio. 15% of dependent variables equaling to zero 
certainly affects the accuracy of regression estimations econometrically. As an alternative test, 
we drop zero debt observations (we drop observations that have zero debt at current year t or 
have zero debt at year t+1) and implement the same capital structure determination regressions 
as Equation (10) and Equation (11). Table 1.6 reports the results of tests on non-zero debt 
observations. Coefficient of determination of book leverage ratio regression in Column (1) drops 
to 14.6%, which is about 6% lower than the Coefficient of determination for the entire sample 
regression. Column (2) shows that the Coefficient of determination of standardized leverage 
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regression increases to 36.1% which is 5% larger than the entire sample regression. The 
Coefficient of determination of standardized leverage regression in Column (2) is more than the 
double of Coefficient of determination of book leverage regression in Column (1). Similar results 
are observed in Column (3) and (4) of Table 1.6. By including industry median capital structure, 
Coefficient of determination of standardized leverage regression is 40.4% and Coefficient of 
determination for book leverage regression is 16.7%.  
 
1.5 Measure of Target Capital Structure 
Results from previous subsections suggest that standardized leverage ratio is more likely to 
be the true capital structure measure that firms target at. In this subsection, we generally discuss 
the popular target leverage estimation methods from existing literature and propose the proper 
method for the estimation of target standardized leverage and target book leverage. Many 
previous studies discuss about the estimation of target leverage ratio. What is new here is the 
proposition of the estimation method of target standardized leverage. The target standardized 
leverage estimation is important if we believe standardized leverage is more closely related to the 
true capital structure measure firms use while determining target capital structure. 
We start with the general discussion of target capital structure estimation methods. The 
existence of target “capital structure” is supported by a survey paper. Graham and Harvey (2001) 
shows that indeed 81% of firms consider a target debt ratio or range when making debt 
decisions. However, the measurement of target capital structure is not easy since “target capital 
structure” can never be observed. Different measurement of target capital structure lead to quite 
different estimates of speed of adjustment and hence lead to different indications about related 
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theories. Previous estimates of speed of adjustment range widely from as small as 7% (Fama and 
French (2002)) to as large as 35% (Flannery and Rangan (2006)). 
Target Capital structure is not observable. Theoretically, no one can find all target capital 
structure determinants and have a perfect target capital structure measure. We certainly cannot 
either. The bottom line of constructing any target capital structure measure is: do not include 
future information. On one hand, if the estimation of target capital structure requires future 
information, then target measure and speed of adjustment estimation cannot be applied in real-
time application. On the other hand, looking forward bias may generate serious misleading 
results. Flannery and Rangan (2006)’s estimation of speed of adjustment is upward biased 
because of including future information into the estimation. Their main speed estimate of about 
“35%” is got by implementing one-step estimation including firm fixed effect in panel data. By 
including the firm fixed effect in the panel regression, the authors are assuming that they know 
the life-long firm average leverage at any point of time. Under their estimation method, firms’ 
current target leverage is partially determined directly by their realized leverage level in the 
future. The resulted speed estimation is seriously boosted up, since firms’ leverage will certainly 
adjust to their future realized level. Hovakimian and Li (2012) documents the biased speed 
estimation of Flannery and Rangan (2006). Instead of including the firm fixed effect in panel 
regression, Hovakimian and Li (2012) shows that the speed estimation drops from 35% to 17% 
while including firm fixed effect for historical panel data only.  
It is uncertain whether we should include historical panel firm fixed effect into the 
construction of target capital structure. Lemmon Roberts and Zender (2008) finds that the 
majority of variation in leverage ratio is driven by an unobserved time-invariant effect that 
generates surprisingly stable capital structure. If firms’ leverage is indeed quite stable overtime, 
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and researchers fail to find the time-invariant factor, then adding historical panel firm fixed 
effect may benefit target capital structure estimation. However, DeANGELO and Roll (2015) 
finds quite contradicted results. By making deep analysis, their results show that, firm’s capital 
structure is not stable at all and leverage cross-section is also quite unstable. In this case, time-
invariant firm factors do not help on explaining firms’ instable capital structure and target capital 
structure estimation should not include firm fixed effect. We therefore tend to choose Fama and 
French (2002) approach of target capital structure estimation. Target capital structure including 
historical panel fixed effect is used as robustness check for average speed of adjustment 
estimation in Chapter 2.  
Fama and French (2002) estimates target capital structure by implementing cross-sectional 
regression. While estimating target leverage at time t (denoted as 𝑇𝐿𝑡+1), they first implement 
the following regression cross-sectionally for year t: 
 𝐿𝑡 = 𝑋𝑡−1 ⋅ ?̂? + 𝜖𝑡 (13) 
The estimated coefficients are denoted as ?̂?. The target leverage 𝑇𝐿𝑡+1 at time t is then 
calculated as: 
 𝑇𝐿𝑡+1 = 𝑋𝑡 ⋅ ?̂? (14) 
Explanatory variables (X) include the eight variables mentioned earlier this Chapter 
(Explanatory variables in Column (3) of Table 1.3) which are commonly used in previous 
studies. Notice that the coefficients ?̂? used in Equation (14) are estimated by regressing time t 
leverage ratio on explanatory variables of year t-1 cross-sectionally. The target leverage ratio of 
year t+1 estimated at year t is then calculated by multiplying ?̂? on explanatory variables at year 
t. The estimation method mentioned of Equation (14) therefore does not require any information 
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beyond year t and also does not include firm fixed effect. We include industry median capital 
structure in explanatory variables to account for the cross-industry capital structure differences.                         
Target standardized leverage ratio can be estimated by the same method as Fama and 
French (2002). For each year t, we implement the following regression cross-sectionally: 
 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡 = 𝑋𝑡−1 ⋅ 𝛾 + 𝜖𝑡 (15) 
The estimated coefficients 𝛾 are then used to calculate target standardized leverage at year t 
as below: 
 𝑇𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡+1 = 𝑋𝑡 ⋅ 𝛾 (16) 
Notation TSDL stands for target standardized leverage ratio. The estimation of target 
standardized leverage ratio does not require information beyond year t+1.  
For the estimation of historical panel target capital structure, at each time t, we include 
historical observations from year t-6 to year t and implement the following regression: 
𝐿𝑖,𝜏 = 𝑋𝑖,𝜏−1 ⋅ ?̂? + 𝐹𝐸𝑖 + 𝜖𝑡      𝜏 = 𝑡 − 5 𝑡𝑜 𝑡 
We get the estimated coefficients ?̂? and 𝐹𝐸𝑖. The target leverage at time t including 
historical panel fixed firm effect is then calculated as: 
𝑇𝐿𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑓
= 𝑋𝑡 ⋅ ?̂? + 𝐹𝐸𝑖 
Target standardized leverage including historical panel fixed effect is calculated in the 
similar way. Target capital structure estimated by Fama and French (2002) approach is the main 
measure used in my dissertation. Target capital structure including historical panel fixed effect is 
used as robustness check while estimating average speed of adjustment in Chapter 2. 
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1.6 Conclusion of Chapter 1 
We propose the methodology of calculating the standardized leverage measure based on the 
assumption that asset value follows geometric Brownian motion process. Different as Merton’s 
model that states firms with zero debt are credit risk free, we replace the book leverage by the 
modified book leverage as the input for calculating standardized leverage ratio. The modified 
book leverage is always larger than zero and can therefore generate positive credit risk for zero 
debt firms. Empirical results of capital structure determination regressions show that 
standardized leverage is more likely to be the true measure of capital structure that firms target at 
compared with book leverage ratio. Capital structure determination regression of standardized 
leverage has much larger coefficient of determinants compared with regression of book leverage. 













Table 1. 1 Summary Statistics 
Summary Statistics of book leverage ratio, standardized leverage ratio and seven firm’s 
characteristics. Firms with historical minimum book asset value and minimum sales less than one million 
are excluded from our sample. The sample is also truncated at 1% level on both sides for Firm Size, 
Tangibility, M/B Ratio, Profitability and Depreciation. Variable R&D is truncated on the right side at 1% 
level 
  Mean St.Dev. Min Max Obs. 
Firm Size 5.143 2.056 0.750 10.269 82320 
Tangibility 0.307 0.239 0.008 0.908 82320 
M/B Ratio 1.742 1.108 0.556 9.250 82320 
R&D 0.047 0.114 0.000 1.300 82320 
RDD 0.567 0.495 0.000 1.000 82320 
Profitability 0.058 0.151 -0.600 0.471 82320 
Depreciation  0.051 0.032 0.004 0.217 82320 
L 0.245 0.208 0.000 1.000 82320 















Table 1. 2  Partial Adjustment Regression With Constant Target Leverage Ratio 
 
Table 1.2 estimates future leverage average transition by regressing future 1-year and 2-year 
leverage on constant term and current leverage. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 𝐿𝑡+1 𝐿𝑡+2 𝐿𝑡+1 𝐿𝑡+2 
𝐿𝑡   0.895 0.800 
   (116.52) (73.33) 
     
Constant 0.0264 0.0468 0.0304 0.0533 
 (15.43) (14.32) (16.45) (16.58) 
Observations 14736 13022 94125 83629 


































Table 1. 3  Cross-sectional Capital Structure Determination Regression 
Table 1.3 reports the results of capital structure determinants cross-sectional regression for book 
leverage and standardized leverage ratio. Entire sample is used for the test. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 𝐿𝑡+1 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡+1 𝐿𝑡+1 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡+1 
Firm Size 0.0210 -0.229 0.0189 -0.212 
 (12.19) (-10.46) (10.74) (-10.26) 
     
Tangibility 0.168 -0.215 0.108 0.103 
 (25.41) (-2.49) (20.31) (2.03) 
     
M/B Ratio -0.0152 -0.119 -0.0125 -0.126 
 (-6.23) (-7.45) (-5.47) (-8.41) 
     
R&D -0.174 -0.147 -0.111 -0.297 
 (-9.49) (-1.68) (-6.49) (-4.14) 
     
RDD -0.0395 0.0146 -0.0224 -0.0422 
 (-20.53) (0.79) (-14.07) (-3.40) 
     
Profitability -0.212 -2.225 -0.208 -2.209 
 (-14.55) (-22.21) (-14.66) (-23.10) 
     
Depreciation -0.00122 5.136 0.120 3.337 
 (-0.02) (14.45) (1.87) (8.58) 
     
Ind. Median L   0.357  
   (23.95)  
     
Ind. Median SDL    0.525 
    (16.14) 
     
Constant 0.141 -0.405 0.0783 0.355 
 (7.62) (-2.90) (4.98) (3.43) 
N 65195 65195 65195 65195 










Table 1. 4  Cross-sectional Capital Structure Determination Regression for Firms With 
Credit Default Swaps Issued Outside 
Table 1.4 reports the results of capital structure determinants cross-sectional regression for book 
leverage and standardized leverage ratio. We include firms that ever have CDS contracts outside as the 
sample for the test.  
 (1) (2) 
 CDS Sample CDS Sample 
 𝐿𝑡+1 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡+1 
Firm Size -0.0130 -0.291 
 (-5.15) (-11.84) 
   
Tangibility 0.105 -0.567 
 (12.67) (-5.66) 
   
M/B Ratio -0.00565 -0.124 
 (-1.05) (-4.53) 
   
R&D -0.310 0.114 
 (-8.41) (0.44) 
   
RDD -0.0336 0.0679 
 (-9.47) (3.18) 
   
Profitability -0.249 -2.204 
 (-6.87) (-7.13) 
   
Depreciation -0.0568 8.051 
 (-0.47) (12.61) 
   
Constant 0.439 0.0626 
 (32.81) (0.40) 
Observations 10263 10263 

















Table 1. 5  One-Step Panel Regression 
Flannery and Rangan (2006) panel regression. This panel regression can estimate speed of 
adjustment and target capital structure simultaneously. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Whole Sample Whole Sample CDS Sample CDS Sample 
 𝐿𝑡+1 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡+1 𝐿𝑡+1 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡+1 
𝐿𝑡 0.876  0.876  
 (432.58)  (188.51)  
     
𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡  0.713  0.711 
  (248.53)  (100.54) 
     
Firm Size 0.00195 -0.0748 -0.000795 -0.0639 
 (10.39) (-40.64) (-1.41) (-9.41) 
     
Tangibility 0.0208 -0.00321 0.0168 -0.149 
 (11.21) (-0.19) (4.78) (-3.62) 
     
M/B Ratio -0.000868 0.00220 0.0000454 0.0360 
 (-2.46) (0.69) (0.05) (3.45) 
     
R&D -0.0127 -0.193 -0.0187 -0.399 
 (-3.30) (-5.54) (-1.59) (-2.96) 
     
RDD -0.00731 -0.0194 -0.00512 -0.0153 
 (-9.17) (-2.68) (-3.20) (-0.83) 
     
Profitability -0.0131 -0.578 -0.00671 -0.559 
 (-4.58) (-21.72) (-0.72) (-5.06) 
     
Depreciation -0.00646 1.251 -0.0372 2.664 
 (-0.52) (10.89) (-1.31) (7.93) 
     
Constant 0.0225 -0.0937 0.0448 -0.250 
 (15.86) (-7.47) (8.55) (-4.34) 
Observations 65195 63657 10263 10109 










Table 1. 6  Cross-sectional Capital Structure Determination Regression for Firms With 
Non-Zero Debt 
 
Cross-sectional capital structure determination regression on samples with non-zero debt. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 𝐿𝑡+1 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡+1 𝐿𝑡+1 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡+1 
Firm Size 0.0137 -0.262 0.0117 -0.245 
 (9.98) (-12.88) (8.55) (-12.71) 
     
Tangibility 0.146 -0.319 0.0893 0.0238 
 (26.86) (-3.96) (17.43) (0.53) 
     
M/B Ratio -0.0129 -0.133 -0.0102 -0.140 
 (-4.79) (-7.47) (-4.06) (-8.50) 
     
R&D -0.109 0.225 -0.0384 0.0451 
 (-4.35) (1.69) (-1.59) (0.41) 
     
RDD -0.0422 0.00333 -0.0262 -0.0596 
 (-26.56) (0.20) (-16.89) (-5.85) 
     
Profitability -0.191 -1.992 -0.189 -1.973 
 (-13.07) (-18.67) (-13.51) (-20.20) 
     
Depreciation -0.0605 4.891 0.0618 2.884 
 (-0.87) (15.57) (0.95) (8.58) 
     
Ind. Median L   0.350  
   (27.41)  
     
Ind. Median SDL    0.540 
    (16.71) 
     
Constant 0.209 -0.0647 0.146 0.720 
 (13.11) (-0.57) (10.54) (8.58) 
Observations 55941 55941 55941 55941 








Chapter 2: Speed of Adjustment 
2.1 Introduction of Chapter 2 
Speed of adjustment plays an important role in capital structure literature. Trade off theory 
states that firms choose their target debt ratios by trading off tax and other benefits of debt 
financing against the associated financial distress cost. A large speed of adjustment indicates the 
central importance of target capital structure while managers making decisions and hence 
support trade-off theory. A small speed of adjustment may lead to the conclusion that target 
capital structure is not the priority while manager making decisions. Numerous studies estimate 
the magnitude of speed of adjustment. Fama and French (2002), Kayhan and Titman (2007), 
Hovakimian and Li (2012) get estimated speed of adjustment of about 7% to 13%. Flannery and 
Rangan (2006) estimates speed of adjustment as 35%. This chapter discusses the methods of 
estimating speed of adjustment for both book leverage and standardized leverage. We also 
investigate the determinants of speed of adjustment.  
We firstly estimate the average speed of adjustment for book leverage and standardized 
leverage by both one-step and two step estimation methods. For two-step speed estimation 
method, following Fama and French (2002), we firstly estimate the target capital structure by 
running cross-sectional regression in the first stage (Subsection 1.5). For the second stage, we 
regress future change of capital structure on the current deviation to the target capital structure 
cross-sectionally. The average speed of adjustment is then estimated as the coefficient of 
deviation to the target capital structure in the second stage regression. For one-step estimation, 
we follow Flannery and Rangan (2006) to run the panel regression of leverage ratio on the lag 
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leverage ratio and a list of variables. The average speed of adjustment is then calculated as one 
minus the coefficient of lag leverage ratio. Comparison of speed of adjustment for book leverage 
and standardized leverage has important implication about the target capital structure measure. 
Results show that, speed of adjustment for standardized leverage is much larger than speed of 
book leverage under all test specifications. This further support the conjecture of Chapter 1 that 
firms more likely target at standardized leverage ratio. 
We also estimate firm specific time varying speed of adjustment. According to my 
knowledge, we are the first to investigate firm level speed of adjustment. Firm specific speed of 
adjustment measure can on one hand be used to test on the determinants of speed of adjustment. 
On the other hand, results in Chapter 3 show that speed of adjustment is also an important factor 
that affects firms’ credit risk. Firm specific speed of adjustment is estimated in the two-stage 
approach. For the first stage, we implement cross-sectional regression for each year and get the 
target capital structure by calculating the fitted value (Fama and French (2002)). In the second 
stage, we implement rolling partial adjustment regression for each time series with a 10 to 15 
years historical window, which enable us to get the updated firm specific estimated speed of 
adjustment for each year. The firm specific time varying speed of adjustment is estimated for 
both book leverage ratio and standardized leverage ratio. Summary statistics show that the mean 
of firm level standardized leverage speed is significantly larger than the mean of firm level book 
leverage speed. This supports the results that firm adjust at a larger speed to the target 
standardized leverage. 
A good measure of firm specific speed of adjustment measure should predict future 
leverage movement. This is also the prerequisite of expecting speed of adjustment be used as 
pricing factor of CDS contracts. To test on the predictive power of speed of adjustment, we add 
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the interactive term of speed of adjustment and current deviation to the target capital structure 
into the partial adjustment cross-sectional regression. Resulted positive and significant 
coefficient of the interactive term for both book and standardized leverage regression 
demonstrate the predictive power of the firm level speed of adjustment measure.  
Lastly, we investigate the determination of speed of adjustment. We implement two 
methods to explain speed of adjustment. Firm specific speed of adjustment measure which is 
estimated by rolling regression on historical leverage time series can be proxy of firm’s long 
term historical mean speed of adjustment. For the first method, we use the firm specific speed of 
adjustment measure as the dependent variable and regress it on firms’ historical mean 
characteristics cross-sectionally. We find that large and profitable firms tend to have smaller 
speed of adjustment, high growth opportunity firms on average have larger speed of adjustment. 
For the second method, we recognize that besides those stable time-invariant firm characteristics, 
some “high turnover” variables may affect the instantaneous speed of adjustment. In order to 
capture these short-term effects on speed of adjustment, we implement partial adjustment model 
separately for “above target” and “below target” situations. Besides for leverage deviation and 
stable firm characteristics, we include a list of short-term variables like: past year stock return, 
short term debt trend. On one hand, the results confirm the findings of the first method about the 
effects of size, profitability and growth opportunity on speed of adjustment. On the other hand, 
results show that firms tend to decrease its leverage if it’s stock price increases in the past year or 
its debt level start to decrease in the past year. Results of this section explains the determination 
of speed of adjustment. Firms on average adjust to their target and the adjustment behavior can 
be affected by instantaneous market conditions. 
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Remaining of this Chapter is organized as below: Section 2.2 shows the summary statistics 
of key variables. Section 2.3 presents the results of average speed of adjustment estimation. 
Section 2.4 presents the results of firm specific speed of adjustment estimation and the predictive 
power of estimated speed of adjustment measure. Section 2.5 shows the results of speed of 
adjustment determination regressions. Section 2.6 concludes Chapter 2. 
 
2.2 Data Collection and Summary Statistics 
Initial sample for Chapter 2 is the same as the sample used for Chapter 1. Fundamental data 
are drawn from Annual COMPUSTAT database. Stock price information is collected from 
CRSP daily database. Table 1.1 shows the summary statistics of seven firm level characteristics. 
To reduce the effect of tail firms, we exclude firms if the historical minimum sales and historical 
minimum firm size is below one million. We also replace the extreme value observations (one 
percentage, two sides) of firm size, profitability, depreciation, tangibility and market to book 
ratio by missing. Variable R&D is truncated on the right side at 1% level. Table 2.1 shows the 
summary statistics of estimated target book leverage, estimated target standardized leverage, and 
other variables that are newly used in Chapter 2. Section 2.4 discusses the estimation of firm 
specific speed of adjustment. Summary statistics of estimated firm specific speed of adjustment 




2.3 Estimation of Average Speed of Adjustment 
We implement both of two-step and one-step estimation methods for estimating the average 
speed of adjustment. Two-step estimation method is applied by many previous literature 
(Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001), Fama and French (2002)). In the first stage, target 
capital structure is estimated by fitting the cross-sectional regression of leverage (standardized 
leverage) on a list of explanatory lag firm characteristics and industry median capital structure. 
The estimation of target capital structure is discussed in detail in Subsection 1.5. The speed of 
adjustment is then estimated by implementing cross-sectional partial adjustment regression with 
dependent variable of future change of capital structure and regressors as current deviation to the 
target capital structure and constant term. One-step speed of adjustment estimation is used by 
Flannery and Rangan (2006). They implement the panel regression with dependent variable as 
leverage ratio and regressors as lag leverage ratio and a list of determinants of target leverage 
ratio. The average speed of adjustment is then calculated as one minus the coefficient of lag 
leverage ratio. 
2.3.1 Two-step Estimation of Speed of Adjustment 
Target book leverage and target standardized leverage estimation is presented in Subsection 
1.5. The average speed of adjustment is then calculated by implementing cross-sectional partial 
adjustment regression. Partial adjustment models for book leverage ratio and standardized 
leverage ratio are presented below: 
 Δ𝐿𝑡+1 = 𝛼1 + 𝜆 × (𝑇𝐿𝑡+1 − 𝐿𝑡) + 𝜔𝑡+1 (17) 
 Δ𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡+1 = 𝛼2 + 𝜅 × (𝑇𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡+1 − 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡+1 (18) 
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The dependent variable Δ𝐿𝑡+1 and Δ𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡+1 in Equation (17) and Equation (18) denote the 
future one-year change of book leverage and future one-year change of standardized leverage. 
Regressor 𝑇𝐿𝑡+1 − 𝐿𝑡 and 𝑇𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡+1 − 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡 denote the current deviation to the target book 
leverage and deviation to target standardized leverage respectively. We allow the constant term 
in the cross-sectional partial adjustment regression to account for the possible capital structure 
co-movement of all firms for each year. Theoretically, the constant term should not differ much 
from zero. The speed of adjustment for book leverage and standardized leverage are denoted as 𝜆 
and 𝜅 respectively. 
Table 2.2 reports the results of implementing equation (17) and (18). Column (1) and (2) 
report the comparison of speed of adjustment of book leverage and standardized leverage by 
using Fama and French target capital structure. The average speed of adjustment for book 
leverage is estimated as 12.0% in Column (1) and the speed of adjustment for standardized 
leverage is estimated as 28.6%. Speed for standardized leverage is much larger than speed of 
book leverage. Column (3) and (4) show the same comparison by using target capital structure 
estimated by including historical panel firm fixed effect. The speed of book leverage in Column 
(3) equals 14.1% while speed for standardized leverage in Column (4) equals 38.9%.  These 
results show the significant difference between the speed of adjustment for book leverage and 
standardized leverage. 
Early studies argue that partial adjustment regression yields upward biased estimation of 
speed of adjustment since leverage ratio is bounded between zero and one (Kayhan and Titman 
(2007), Chang and Dasgupta (2009)). To accommodate this issue, Hovakimian and Li (2012) 
suggests that the leverage ratio and target leverage ratio should enter separately into the second 
stage partial adjustment mode. Researchers should focus on the coefficient of target leverage 
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which represents the adjustment speed towards the meaningful target leverage. The alternative 
way of implementing partial adjustment model is as below: 
 Δ𝐿𝑡+1 = 𝛼1 + 𝜆1 × 𝑇𝐿𝑡+1 + 𝜆2 × 𝐿𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡+1 (19) 
 Δ𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡+1 = 𝛼2 + 𝜅1 × 𝑇𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡+1 + 𝜅2 × 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡+1 (20) 
From the regression model above, the estimate of speed of adjustment is therefore 𝜆1(𝜅1) or 
−𝜆2(−𝜅2). We focus on 𝜆1 and 𝜅1 which represents the speed of adjustment towards the target 
that has economical meaning. 
Table 2.3 report the estimated results of equation (19) and (20). Column (1) and (2) 
compares the speed of adjustment estimation by using Fama French target capital structure. We 
focus on the coefficients of target capital structure. Column (1) shows that the speed of 
adjustment for book leverage equals to 10.5%. Column (2) shows the estimate of speed for 
standardized leverage as 26.8%. Column (3) and Column (4) shows the same comparison by 
using the target capital structure estimated by historical panel fixed effect approach. Column (3) 
and (4) show that the estimated speed for book leverage equals 7.90% and the estimated speed of 
standardized leverage equals to 27.7%.  
Results of speed of adjustment estimation of book leverage in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 are 
very similar to Hovakimian and Li (2012). Speed of adjustment estimated by the alternative 
implementation of partial adjustment model (Table 2.3) is in general smaller than the speed 
estimated by original version of partial adjustment model (Table 2.2), which is consistent with 
the argument that speed estimated by partial adjustment model is upward biased because of the 
mechanical reversion feature of leverage ratio.    
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2.3.2 One-step Estimation of Speed of Adjustment 
Flannery and Rangan (2006) presents the one-step estimation method of speed of 
adjustment. One-step estimation means that the speed of adjustment and target capital structure 
can be estimated simultaneously in one step. Their regression model is derived from the partial 
adjustment model (equation (17)). By plugging equation (13) into equation (17) and moving the 
lag leverage from left to the right side of equation (17), the one-step estimation regression is then 
written as: 
 𝐿𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + (1 − 𝜆) × 𝐿𝑡 + 𝜆 × (𝛽 ⋅ 𝑋𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡+1 (21) 
And we can similarly have the one-step estimation regression for standardized leverage 
ratio: 
 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + (1 − 𝜅) × 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡 + 𝜅 × (𝛾 ⋅ 𝑋𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡+1 (22) 
One minus the coefficient of the lag leverage (standardized leverage) equals the estimated 
speed of adjustment. 
Table 2.4 reports the estimated results of equation (21) and (22). Column (1) and (2) present 
the speed estimation results by including firm fixed effect in the panel regression. Column (1) 
shows similar speed of book leverage estimation of 35% as Flannery and Rangan (2006). 
Column (2) reports the speed of adjustment of standardized leverage as 52.3% while including 
whole panel firm fixed effect. Speed of standardized leverage is significantly larger than speed of 
book leverage. However, as Hovakimian and Li (2012) pointing out, including firm fixed effect 
in the whole panel regression yields serious upward biased estimation of adjustment speed. 
Therefore, we exclude firm fixed effect and implement the one-step estimation model. The 
results are shown in Column (3) and Column (4) of Table 2.4. Speed of book leverage and speed 
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of standardized leverage are estimated as 12.1% and 29.3% respectively. The magnitude of speed 
of adjustment estimations are smaller in Column (3) and Column (4) by eliminating the bias 
generated by including firm fixed effect. Notice that the speed estimation in Column (3) and 
Column (4) are quite similar to the speed estimation by two-step method using Fama and French 
target capital structure (Column (1) and Column (2) of Table 2.2). 
2.3.3 Discussion of Section 2.3 
In Section 2.3, we estimate the average speed of adjustment for book leverage and 
standardized leverage by using both Two-step and One-step methods and employing both Fama 
French approach target capital structure and historical panel fixed effect target capital structure. 
Under all specifications, the speed of adjustment for standardized leverage is much larger than 
speed of adjustment for book leverage. Larger speed of adjustment for standardized leverage 
ratio support the argument we have in Chapter 1 that standardized leverage ratio is more likely to 
be the capital structure measure firms target at. The results of larger estimated speed for 
standardized leverage is consistent with the results of larger coefficient of determination for 
capital structure determination regression of standardized leverage ratio. 
 
2.4 Measure of Firm Specific Speed of Adjustment  
It has been decades that literature focus on estimating the average speed of adjustment. 
Average speed of adjustment is important since it is the crucial evidence of whether target 
leverage is of the top importance while making capital structure decisions. However, the 
existence of target capital structure has been proven by Graham and Harvey (2001). Their survey 
concludes that indeed 81% of firms have target debt level or range. We should move one step 
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forward to study on the measurement of firm specific speed of adjustment and the determinants 
of firm specific speed of adjustment. Given that firms all have a target, what matters is how well 
firms can maintain at their target. The overall average speed measurement is certainly important, 
the cross-sectional difference of speed of adjustment is also important.  
2.4.1 Estimation of Firm Specific Speed of Adjustment 
We estimate firm specific speed of adjustment by implementing partial adjustment 
regression on each firm’s historical time series of leverage or standardized leverage. The time 
series partial adjustment regression is implemented on the rolling window base, the speed 
estimates can therefore be updated each year. While estimating firm specific speed of 
adjustment, we choose to use the target capital structure estimated by Fama French approach. 
Fama French target capital structure does not require future information and does not include 
historical panel firm fixed effect. While measuring firm specific speed of adjustment, we care 
about the ability firms can adjust to the cross-sectional reasonable capital structure. We do not 
care whether firm can stick to the capital structure level they used to stay at. To estimate a 
particular firm’s specific speed of adjustment at year t, we implement the following regression: 
 𝐿𝑖,𝜏+1 − 𝐿𝑖,𝜏 = 𝜆𝑖,𝑡 × (𝑇𝐿𝑖,𝜏+1 − 𝐿𝑖,𝜏) + 𝜖𝑖,𝜏+1 , 𝜏 = 𝑡 − ℎ 𝑡𝑜 𝑡 − 1 (23) 
For the above time series regression, 𝜆𝑖,𝑡 denotes firm i’s specific speed of adjustment at 
year t. The important difference between equation (23) and equation (17) is, equation (23) does 
not include the constant term. It is okay to add the constant into the cross-sectional partial 
adjustment model since the constant term may capture the instantaneous common move of all 
firms. Although the constant term should equal to zero theoretically, but it would not generate 
serious bias for speed estimation for cross-sectional partial adjustment regression. However, it is 
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a very different case for implementing partial adjustment regression on time series. Constant 
term in time series regression can capture the average difference between historical capital 
structure and the target capital structure and therefore seriously bias the estimation of firm 
specific speed. The time series starts from 𝑡 − ℎ and ends at 𝑡 − 1. Time series ending at 𝑡 − 1 
guarantees that the speed estimation does not require information beyond time t. At the end of 
the time series where 𝜏 = 𝑡 − 1, term 𝐿𝑖,𝜏+1 = 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 requires information up to time t, and term 
𝑇𝐿𝑖,𝜏+1 = 𝑇𝐿𝑖,𝑡 requires information up to time t-1 (Equation (14)). The length of the historical 
time series window equals to h. Hence 𝜆𝑖,𝑡 is the firm specific speed of adjustment which 
measures how quick this firm on average adjust to its target in the past h years (assuming annual 
observations).  
Similar as the beta estimation in CAPM, the firm level speed of adjustment should not be 
assumed as constant. The true firm level speed of adjustment may change over time. However, 
we cannot observe the instantaneous speed of adjustment just like one cannot observe the 
instantaneous beta of CAPM. Firm level speed estimation 𝜆𝑖,𝑡 from equation (9) is not the 
estimation of instantaneous speed at time t. It measures the average speed of this firm for the past 
h years. The true firm level speed of adjustment should equal to 𝜆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖,𝑡, where 𝜂𝑖,𝑡 stands for 
the difference between the true speed and the rolling historical average speed. The difference 𝜂𝑖,𝑡 
cannot be estimated instantaneously. Later part of this section describes factors that may explain 
𝜂𝑖,𝑡. 
While estimating firm specific speed of adjustment, we arbitrarily set h=15 which means 
the firm specific speed of adjustment is measured as the average speed of adjustment for the past 
15 years. To reduce the worries that missing observations may generate noisy estimation, we set 
the estimated speed as missing if the number of un-missing variables are smaller than 10 for each 
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historical window. We also tried alternative choices of h, our main results are not sensitive to the 
length of estimation window. By choosing a particular h, firms (from 1989 to 2016) that have 
less than h+1 year observations are automatically deleted from the sample for firm specific speed 
estimation. So there exist sample selection bias of firms’ age for calculating firm specific speed 
of adjustment. 
Caption of Figure 2.1 reports the summary statistics of firm specific speed of adjustment. 
The mean speed of book leverage equals to 21.3% while the mean speed of standardized 
leverage equals to 33.1%. The median speed of book leverage equals 16.4% and the median 
speed of standardized leverage equals to 29.4%. The summary statistics support our conclusion 
that the speed of standardized leverage is on average larger than speed of book leverage. The 
distribution comparison of speeds estimated on book leverage and standardized leverage confirm 
our arguments. The distribution of speed of standardized leverage is more symmetric and peaks 
at 30%. The distribution of speed of book leverage is skewed to the right and peaks at 15%. 
2.4.2 Physical Predictive Power of Firm Specific Speed Measure 
The estimation of firm specific speed of adjustment does not require information beyond the 
current year t. A meaningful measure of firm specific speed of adjustment at year t should 
predict the future leverage adjustment behavior. That is, we expect firms that measured as having 
larger speed should adjust faster in the future and firms with smaller estimated specific speed of 
adjustment should adjust slower in the future. The physical predictive power is important 
evidence to claim that our newly created firm specific speed of adjustment measure is useful. 




The test of predictive power is still based on partial adjustment model. At year t, we 
implement the cross-sectional partial adjustment model as below: 
 Δ𝐿𝑡+1 = 𝛼1 + (𝜆0 + 𝛽 × 𝜆𝑖,𝑡) × (𝑇𝐿𝑡+1 − 𝐿𝑡) + 𝜔𝑡+1 (24) 
We model the speed of adjustment by 𝜆0 + 𝛽 × 𝜆𝑖,𝑡. Where 𝜆0 denotes the base speed that 
all firms share in common. Variable 𝜆𝑖,𝑡 is the estimated historical firm specific speed of 
adjustment measure which is used to explain the cross-sectional difference of firm’s adjustment 
speed. Equation (24) can be simplified as: 
 Δ𝐿𝑡+1 = 𝛼1 + 𝜆0 × 𝐿𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑡 + 𝛽 × (𝜆𝑖,𝑡 ⋅ 𝐿𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑡) + 𝜔𝑡+1 (25) 
Compared with partial adjustment model, equation (25) includes the interactive term of 
current deviation to the target capital structure and firm historical specific speed in order to 
capture the cross-sectional difference of future speed of adjustment. If the estimated firm 
historical specific speed of adjustment measure has the predictive power, then we should expect 
𝛽 in Equation (25) to be positive and significant. The same form of partial adjustment model is 
applied on standardized leverage. The regression model for standardized leverage is as below: 
 Δ𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡+1 = 𝛼2 + 𝜅0 × 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑡 + 𝛾 × (𝜅𝑖,𝑡 ⋅ 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑡) + 𝜔𝑡+1 (26) 
SDLDev denotes the deviation to the target standardized leverage. Kappa stands for 
estimated firm historical specific speed of adjustment of standardized leverage. If the firm 
specific speed of standardized leverage has predictive power, then we expect to observe positive 
significant coefficient of 𝛾. 
Table 2.5 reports the baseline results of implementing equation (25) and Equation (26) 
cross-sectionally. Column (1) and Column (3) reports the partial adjustment regression without 
the interaction term. Column (2) reports the results of equation (25). The base speed of book 
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leverage is estimated as 7.76%, The coefficient of interaction term is both statistically and 
economically significant. Notice that the standard deviation of speed of book leverage is 21%. 
One standard deviation change in historical mean book leverage speed can lead to 3.3% 
difference of future realized adjustment speed. Column (4) reports the results of equation (26). 
The base speed of standardized leverage is 24.2%. The coefficient of interactive term is 14.0%. 
One standard deviation changes of historical mean speed of adjustment yields 3.8% change in 
future realized speed of adjustment for standardized leverage. The significant positive coefficient 
of interactive term indicate that the firm historical specific speed of adjustment can significantly 
predict future leverage adjustment behavior. 
Will the predictive power of firm historical specific speed of adjustment measure decay 
quickly? Speed of adjustment is supposed to be a stable firm feature; hence we expect the 
predictive power of firm specific speed measure to be persistent. To test on the persistency of the 
predictive power of firm specific speed measure, we re-implement equation (25) and (26) by 
using lag 2 years speed measure and lag 5 years speed measure. Table 2.6 reports the results of 
using lag speed measure. Column (1) and (2) implement Equation (25) by using lag two-year 
book leverage speed and lag five-year book leverage speed interactive term respectively. The 
interactive term of deviation and lag speed are positive and significant which indicate that the 
predictive power of firm specific speed measure is persistent. Column (3) and (4) tests Equation 
(26) by using lag two-year and lag five-year speed interactive term respectively. The coefficients 
of interactive terms for both Column (3) and (4) are positive and significant. 
We also use alternative method to show the predictive power of firm specific speed of 
adjustment measure. Instead of looking at the future change of leverage, we investigate the future 
change of deviation to the target capital structure. At each time 𝑡0, we sort the cross-section of 
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deviation to the target capital structure. The percentile of deviation at 𝑡0 is denoted as 𝑝0. Our 
test investigates whether larger speed firms’ deviation to the target capital structure can converge 
quicker in the future. We group all firms into small speed, median speed and large speed group 
based on the firm historical specific speed measure at year 𝑡0. Cross-sectional firm specific speed 
with range of 0% to 30%, 30% to 70% and 70% to 100% are classified as small speed firm, 
median speed firm and large speed firm respectively. Within each speed group, we study how 
deviation to the target capital structure converge in the future two years. Across each speed 
group, we study on whether group classified as large speed group can indeed converge faster in 
the future. The test is designed as the following. Within each speed group, we focus on five sub-
group named as: Serious below target, below target, on target, above target and serious above 
target. These groups are defined according to their percentile of deviation to the target capita 
structure at 𝑡0. Serious below target is defined as firm’s deviation ranks around 90% percentile 
(Deviation equals target minus current level, so positive deviation indicates below target and 
negative deviation stands for above target). Below target is defined as around 75% percentile of 
deviation. On target is defined as around 50% percentile of deviation. Above target and Serious 
above target are defined as target deviation around 25% and 10% percentile respectively. For 
each of the five sub-group within each speed group, we calculate the average deviation for the 
current and future two years by using the kernel weight summation technology. The kernel 
weight is defined as:  
𝑤𝑖 = 𝑁(𝑝
∗ − 𝑝𝑖, 0, 𝑏) 
 𝑝∗ stands for the deviation percentile threshold (10%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 90%), 𝑝𝑖 
denotes the percentile of firm i’s deviation to target capital structure at year 𝑡0. N(.) denotes 
normal distribution density function. b stands for bandwidth which is set as 1%.  
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For each sub-group of each speed group, the future weighted sum of deviation to the target 





Where 𝑀𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑡0+𝜏 denotes the weighted sum of deviation to target capital structure for year 
𝑡0 + 𝜏 (𝜏 = 0,1,2). 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡0+𝜏 stands for the current and future realized deviation to the target 
capital structure at year 𝑡0 + 𝜏. 
The results of the test for each speed group and each sub-group are displayed in figure 2.2 
and figure 2.3. Figure 2.2 reports the results of test for book leverage ratio. For brevity, the 
median speed group is not displayed. According to figure 2.2, large speed group classified by 
firm historical specific speed measure indeed converge quicker than small speed group. For the 
serious above target sub-group, the weighted average of initial deviation is -0.25 which means 
25% above the target leverage. For the small speed group, the weighted average deviation 
converges to -21% while the large speed group on average converges to -16% of deviation in two 
years. For the Serious below target group, starting from the initial deviation of 17%, the small 
speed group converges to 15% in two years while the large speed group converges to 11%. We 
get the similar results for the test of standardized leverage. Figure 2.3 demonstrates the 
comparison of small speed and large speed group for standardized leverage test. The large speed 




2.5 Determinants of Speed of Adjustment 
Determinants of speed of adjustment is a new topic since we do not have a firm specific 
speed of adjustment measure before. We propose the method of firm specific speed of 
adjustment estimation and show that this measure indeed has predictive power, therefore, the 
newly created measure can be used to study the determinants of speed of adjustment. In this 
section, we propose two methods of studying the determinants of speed of adjustment. For the 
first method, we regress the firm’s historical specific speed measure on firm’s historical mean 
characteristics cross-sectionally. Since the firm specific speed measure is a historical mean speed 
measure, the first method can only investigate the determinants of the “stable part” of speed of 
adjustment. To capture the short-term determinants of speed, we conduct the second method. We 
implement the partial adjustment model separately for above and below target situations. For 
each separate regression, we regress the change of capital structure on current deviation to the 
target and a list of variables that may affect the instantaneous capital structure adjustment. 
2.5.1 Explaining firm specific historical mean speed of adjustment 
As discussed in section 2.4, firm specific speed can only be estimated on the historical time 
series. Firm specific speed measure is therefore regarded as the historical mean adjustment 
speed. The true speed equals to the sum of historical mean speed and an instantaneous speed. 
This subsection focuses on the determination of rolling historical mean speed of adjustment. The 
firm specific speed of estimation measure is used as dependent variable of the speed 
determination cross-sectional regression: 
 𝜆𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝑋 ⋅ 𝛽 + 𝜔𝑡 (27) 
 𝜅𝑡 = 𝛼2 + 𝑋 ⋅ 𝛾 + 𝜖𝑡 (28) 
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Dependent variables are estimated by the historical rolling window of 15 years. Therefore, 
explanatory variables X cannot be variables at t, X should measure the historical mean of firm 
characteristics for the past 15 years. Equation (27) and (28) study the determinants of the stable 
component of speed of adjustment. Since X is measured as the historical 15 years mean firm 
characteristics, we only include “stable” firm characteristics into the regression analysis.  X 
includes firm size, market to book ratio, profitability and tangibility. Each explanatory variable is 
calculated as the 15 years historical mean of cross-sectional quantiles. 
Column (1) and Column (2) of Table 2.7 display the coefficients results of equation (27) 
and (28) respectively. We get consistent results for firm size and market to book ratio. Larger 
firms tend to adjust towards the target capital structure slower, high growth opportunity firm tend 
to adjust towards target at a larger speed. However, the coefficients of size and book to market 
ratio are not quite significant economically. While firms’ average size percentile ranking 
increase from 25% to 75%, its predicted speed of adjustment only decreases by 1.77% and 
3.83% for book leverage ratio and standardized leverage ratio. If firm’s average book to market 
ratio percentile increases from 25% to 75%, then predicted speed of adjustment would increase 
by 2.7% and 2.1% respectively for book leverage and standardized leverage ratio. These impacts 
are not economically significant given the standard deviation of speed for book leverage and 
standardized leverage are 20.88% and 27.48% correspondingly. The Coefficient of determination 
of the two cross-sectional regression is also quite low as 0.6% and 1.3% respectively.  
2.5.2 Explaining Speed of Adjustment with Partial Adjustment Model 
We investigate the determinants of the instantaneous speed of adjustment by implementing 
partial adjustment model. We improve the partial adjustment model as below: 
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 Δ𝐿𝑡+1 = 𝛼1 + 𝜆 × (𝑇𝐿𝑡+1 − 𝐿𝑡) + 𝛾 ⋅ 𝑍𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡+1 (29) 
 Δ𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡+1 = 𝛼1 + 𝜅 × (𝑇𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡+1 − 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡) + 𝛽 ⋅ 𝑍𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡+1 (30) 
We include Z variables which may determine the instantaneous part of speed of adjustment. 
Z includes a list of variables: Firm Size, Market to Book Ratio, Profitability, Tangibility, Debt 
Pay-Down, Past stock return, Asset Growth and Sales Growth. The first four firm characteristics 
are defined as the cross-sectional rank of each firm feature in percentile. Debt Pay-Down is a 
binary variable which equals to one if current total debt level is smaller than previous year’s total 
debt level and equals to zero otherwise. Past stock return is defined as the cross-sectional 
percentile ranking of past one-year stock return. Asset growth and Sales growth are defined as 
the asset and sales growth rate for the past year in percentage. 
Since the purpose of the test is to investigate the determinants of the instantaneous part of 
speed of adjustment, the partial adjustment model is implemented separately for Below Target 
and Above Target situations. For Below Target situation, larger speed firm should increase more 
of their leverage in the coming year, therefore, variable that positively affect adjustment speed 
should have positive sign. For Above Target situation, larger speed firm should decrease more of 
its leverage ratio in the next year. Therefore, variable that positively affect speed of adjustment 
should have negative coefficient in the partial adjustment regression. Hence, one can conclude a 
variable positively or negatively affect speed of adjustment only when its coefficient signs are 
opposite for Below Target and Above Target situations regression. If the coefficient signs are the 
same for Below Target and Above Target situations, then this variable does not affect speed of 
adjustment in the consistent way. 
Table 2.8 reports results of equation (29) and (30). Column (1) and (2) show the cross-
sectional regression for book leverage ratio of Below Target and Above Target situations 
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respectively. Column (3) and (4) show the results of Below Target and Above Target 
respectively for standardized leverage ratio regression. Deviation to the target capital structure 
are all strongly significant positive for all four columns. The coefficients of deviation to target 
capital structure can be regarded as the base speed of adjustment (or the intercept). Speed of 
adjustment is on average larger for the Below Target situation for both book leverage and 
standardized leverage measure. For all Z variables, firm size and market to book ratio are the 
only two variables that have opposite signs for Below Target and Above Target situations. The 
coefficient for firm size is negative for Below Target situation, which means larger firm tend to 
increase leverage less in the coming year when current leverage is below the target. So larger 
firms adjust slower for Below Target situation. For the Above Target Situation, the coefficient of 
firm size appears as positive. Larger firm tends to decrease less or increase more when firm’s 
leverage is above the target. Which means larger firms still tend to adjust slower for the Above 
Target situation. So generally, we can conclude that larger firm adjust slower. Notice that, the 
results are the same as the results from section 2.5.1. Unfortunately, the coefficients of firm size 
are not significant for standardized leverage regression, so our conclusion is not strongly 
supported by our results. The results of market to book ratio are also consistent with Subsection 
2.5.1 results. High growth opportunity firm tend to adjust faster. They tend to increase their 
leverage more for Below Target situation and decrease their leverage more for Above Target 
situation. The coefficients of market to book ratio are significant for both book leverage ratio and 
standardized leverage ratio. So, we confirm the earlier results that high market to book ratio 
firms tend to have larger speed of adjustment. Tangibility seems to have a one side effect. The 
coefficients of tangibility are not significant for Below Target. For Above Target situation, high 
tangibility firm tend to adjust at a slower speed. 
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Other Z variables appear to have same sign coefficients for Below Target and Above Target 
situations. We see negative coefficient of profitability for both situations, which means profitable 
firms tend to decrease their leverage regardless of whether they are above or below their target. 
Debt Pay-Down dummy shows negative coefficients for all Columns. Once firm decrease its 
debt level, they tend to keep de-leveraging in the coming year. Consistent with Market timing 
theorem, firms with high past-year stock return tend to decrease its leverage in the next year. 
Firms with high past-year asset growth rate and sales growth rate tend to increase their leverage 
in the future year.  
 
2.6 Conclusion of Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 studies the speed of adjustment in detail. We demonstrate the results of the 
estimation of over-all speed of adjustment for book leverage and standardized leverage ratio. 
Both two-step and one-step results show that speed of adjustment for standardized leverage is 
much larger than speed for book leverage. This result supports our conclusion in Chapter 1 that 
firms are more likely target at standardized leverage ratio. We also propose the method for 
estimating the firm specific historical speed of adjustment for book leverage and standardized 
leverage. To my knowledge, we are the first to have firm specific speed of adjustment estimator. 
While making estimation, we implement the partial adjustment model on the historical capital 
structure time series for the length of window of 15 years. The target capital structure is 
estimated following the Fama and French (2002) approach demonstrated in Chapter 1. These 
speed of adjustment estimators shows strong power on predicting future capital structure 
adjustment. The effect of speed estimators on future capital structure adjustment is statistically 
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and economically significant. Lastly, we discuss the determinants of speed of adjustment by two 
methods. Results show that larger size, high tangibility and low market to book ratio firms tend 
to have lower speed of adjustment. We also study the effect of a list of high turnover variables on 
the instantaneous capital structure adjustment behavior. 
 
Table 2. 1  Summary Statistics 
Summary Statistics of key variables used in Chapter 2 
  Mean St.Dev. Min Max Obs 
Firm Size 5.180 2.184 0.005 12.086 80468 
M/B Ratio 1.829 1.334 0.556 9.250 80468 
Profitability 0.048 0.199 -0.950 0.471 80468 
Tangibility 0.306 0.246 0.000 1.000 80468 
Debt PD 0.441 0.497 0.000 1.000 80468 
Past Return 0.110 0.568 -0.798 2.399 80468 
Asset Growth 0.049 0.267 -0.798 1.124 80468 















Table 2. 2  Second Stage Partial Adjustment Cross-sectional Regression 
The second stage cross-sectional regression to estimate the speed of adjustment towards target book 
leverage and target standardized leverage. Target capital structure is estimated by both Fama French 
(2002) method and Historical panel fixed effect method. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Δ𝐿𝑡+1 Δ𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡+1 Δ𝐿𝑡+1 Δ𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡+1 
𝐿𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑡
𝑓
 0.120    
 (15.83)    
     
𝑆𝐷𝐿𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑡
𝑓
  0.286   
  (16.62)   
     
𝐿𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑡
ℎ   0.142  
   (11.03)  
     
𝑆𝐷𝐿𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑡
ℎ    0.389 
    (17.93) 
     
Constant 0.00269 -0.0104 0.00343 -0.00820 
 (1.17) (-0.12) (1.34) (-0.08) 
N 61836 61836 46661 46661 
R2 0.052 0.141 0.016 0.094 






















Table 2. 3 Second Stage Partial Adjustment Cross-sectional Regression With Separate 
Regressors 
The second stage cross-sectional regression to estimate the speed of adjustment towards target book 
leverage and target standardized leverage. Target capital structure is estimated by both Fama French 
(2002) method and Historical panel fixed effect method. Deviation to target capital structure is separated 
into two regressors, current capital structure and target capital structure. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Δ𝐿𝑡+1 Δ𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡+1 Δ𝐿𝑡+1 Δ𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡+1 
L -0.118  -0.153  
 (-15.87)  (-11.43)  
     
𝑇𝐿𝑓 0.105    
 (11.99)    
     
𝑇𝐿ℎ   0.0790  
   (7.30)  
     
SDL  -0.284  -0.422 
  (-16.73)  (-23.03) 
     
𝑇𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑓  0.268   
  (7.79)   
     
𝑇𝑆𝐷𝐿ℎ    0.277 
    (13.10) 
     
Constant 0.00526 -0.0984 0.0206 -0.296 
 (2.23) (-1.61) (10.04) (-5.01) 
N 61836 61836 46661 46661 
R2 0.053 0.162 0.043 0.171 












Table 2. 4  One-Step Speed of Adjustment Estimation 
Flannery and Rangan (2006) one step speed estimation. The estimated speed of adjustment equals to 
one minus the coefficient of current capital structure. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 𝐿𝑡+1 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡+1 𝐿𝑡+1 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡+1 
𝐿𝑡 0.650  0.879  
 (191.73)  (419.59)  
     
𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡  0.477  0.707 
  (109.41)  (218.46) 
     
Firm Size 0.0116 -0.0414 0.00178 -0.0749 
 (18.65) (-7.20) (9.42) (-40.69) 
     
Tangibility 0.0279 0.237 0.0109 0.00816 
 (5.67) (5.19) (5.51) (0.49) 
     
M/B Ratio -0.000673 0.0458 0.000212 0.00175 
 (-1.42) (10.33) (0.60) (0.55) 
     
R&D 0.0134 -0.0457 -0.00301 -0.201 
 (1.88) (-0.69) (-0.77) (-5.77) 
     
RDD 0.00102 -0.0107 -0.00498 -0.0220 
 (0.49) (-0.54) (-6.07) (-3.04) 
     
Ind Median L 0.126  0.0523  
 (12.06)  (11.80)  
     
Ind Median SDL  0.127  0.0214 
  (18.32)  (4.27) 
     
Profitability -0.00914 -0.555 -0.0145 -0.591 
 (-2.57) (-16.71) (-5.05) (-22.07) 
     
Depreciation 0.0609 1.816 0.0138 1.188 
 (2.94) (9.35) (1.10) (10.25) 
     
Constant -0.0119 -0.668 0.0112 -0.0685 
 (-2.50) (-17.14) (6.91) (-4.94) 
N 63657 63657 63657 63657 
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R2 0.836 0.690 0.794 0.629 
 
 
Table 2. 5  Predictive Power of Firm Specific Speed Measure on Future Capital Structure 
Adjustment 
Test of the predictive power of firm specific speed of adjustment by including the interactive term of 
deviation to target capital structure and speed of adjustment. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Δ𝐿𝑡+1 Δ𝐿𝑡+1 ΔSD𝐿𝑡+1 ΔSD𝐿𝑡+1 
𝐿𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑡 0.0917 0.0776   
 (11.60) (10.89)   
     
𝜆 × 𝐿𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑡  0.153   
  (6.29)   
     
𝑆𝐷𝐿𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑡   0.281 0.242 
   (8.92) (7.27) 
     
𝜅 × 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑡    0.140 
    (3.38) 
     
Constant -0.0000335 0.000143 -0.0490 -0.0499 
 (-0.01) (0.05) (-0.33) (-0.34) 
N 17148 17148 13673 13673 





























Table 2. 6  Persistency Test of Predictive Power of Firm Specific Speed Measure: Using 
Lag of Firm Specific Speed Measure 
Predictive power test by using the lag five-year speed of adjustment measure. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Δ𝐿𝑡+1 Δ𝐿𝑡+1 ΔSD𝐿𝑡+1 ΔSD𝐿𝑡+1 
𝐿𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑡 0.0738 0.0612   
 (7.24) (5.88)   
     
𝐿2. 𝜆 × 𝐿𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑡 0.142    
 (4.14)    
     
𝐿5. 𝜆 × 𝐿𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑡  0.101   
  (3.42)   
     
𝑆𝐷𝐿𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑡   0.254 0.254 
   (7.92) (6.12) 
     
𝐿2. 𝜅 × 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑡   0.101  
   (2.09)  
     
𝐿5. 𝜅 × 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑡    0.137 
    (2.89) 
     
Constant 0.000206 0.00392 -0.0306 0.0428 
 (0.06) (1.16) (-0.19) (0.23) 
N 12583 8113 11544 7249 
R2 0.045 0.033 0.145 0.160 


















Table 2. 7  Determination of Speed of Adjustment: Cross-sectional Regression 
 (1) (2) 
 𝜆 𝜅 
HM Firm Size -0.0357 -0.0767 
 (-3.45) (-5.61) 
   
HM M/B Ratio 0.0542 0.0418 
 (7.12) (2.44) 
   
HM Profitability -0.0234 0.00131 
 (-1.53) (0.06) 
   
HM Tangibility -0.0106 -0.00593 
 (-2.16) (-0.37) 
   
Constant 0.224 0.365 
 (29.99) (26.43) 
N 9866 9450 




















Table 2. 8  Revised Second Stage Partial Adjustment Regression 
Partial adjustment model implemented separately by above target and below target. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Below Tgt Above Tgt Below Tgt Above Tgt 
 Δ𝐿𝑡+1 Δ𝐿𝑡+1 ΔSD𝐿𝑡+1 Δ𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡+1 
𝐿𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑡 0.128 0.0753   
 (15.96) (9.55)   
     
𝑆𝐷𝐿𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑡   0.347 0.277 
   (19.82) (13.88) 
     
Firm Size Index -0.00816 0.00924 -0.103 0.0209 
 (-3.66) (2.95) (-0.82) (0.25) 
     
M/B Index 0.0216 -0.0206 0.0746 -0.133 
 (8.95) (-4.58) (1.56) (-3.62) 
     
Profitability Index -0.00307 -0.00214 -0.122 -0.0598 
 (-1.06) (-0.34) (-3.74) (-1.33) 
     
Tangibility Index -0.00118 0.00979 0.0218 0.0706 
 (-0.46) (2.39) (0.44) (2.25) 
     
Debt PD -0.000354 -0.00753 -0.0442 -0.0546 
 (-0.41) (-4.15) (-3.05) (-4.68) 
     
Past Return Index -0.00742 -0.0216 -0.0656 -0.114 
 (-3.05) (-5.93) (-1.31) (-3.95) 
     
Asset Growth 0.0132 0.00409 0.0630 0.0805 
 (3.81) (1.02) (1.40) (1.77) 
     
Sales Growth 0.00840 0.00442 0.112 0.0665 
 (4.69) (1.43) (4.03) (3.97) 
     
Constant -0.000286 0.0125 0.0697 0.123 
 (-0.09) (3.46) (1.02) (2.08) 
N 29200 26651 22257 29732 
R2 0.037 0.048 0.151 0.134 















Figure 2. 1  Summary Statistics of Firm Specific Speed Measures 
 
 Mean P25 P50 P75 St.Dev. Obs. 
𝜆 0.2129 0.0574 0.1643 0.3232 0.2088 17146 







Figure 2. 2  Alternative Test of Predictive Power of Firm Specific Speed Measure (𝝀) 
 
 




Chapter 3: Speed of Adjustment and Credit Risk 
3.1 Introduction to Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 discusses how speed of adjustment affects credit risk measured by Credit 
Spreads. Merton model is by far the most successful credit risk model. Merton assumes firm’s 
asset value follows geometric Brownian motion and firm would default if its asset value goes 
below the constant debt level at the maturity date. However, Merton’s constant debt assumption 
is inconsistent with evidences from Capital structure literature. Trade off theory believes firms 
would target at a leverage ratio that balances out the benefit and cost of debt financing. Previous 
literature support trade off theory by showing firms indeed adjusts towards their target leverage 
(Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001), Fama and French (2002), Flannery and Rangan (2006) 
etc.). These results suggest that firm’s debt is not constant, and more importantly, debt level is 
correlated with asset value by targeting at a particular ratio. Merton’s constant debt assumption 
can then be modified based on empirical evidences from Capital Structure literature. 
Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) propose a theoretical frame work that considers 
firms’ targeting leverage behavior. They assume firm’s leverage follows a mean reverting 
process with a constant target leverage ratio. Firm will default if its leverage ratio goes above 
one at any point of time in the future. According to CG’s frame work (short for framework 
proposed by Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001)), not only the current leverage matters for 
credit risk, other parameters of their model also affect credit risk. Leverage change volatility 
which is quite similar to Merton’s asset volatility matters, which has been pointed out by Merton 
model and proved to be important empirically. Target leverage certainly matters in the mean 
reverting frame work since it predicts the future leverage. Empirical works have been done to 
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test the effect of target leverage on credit risk. Flannery, Nikolova and Öztekin (2012) shows that 
target leverage positively affects bond credit spreads in along with leverage ratio. Elkamhi, 
Pungaliya and Vijh (2014) shows that both current leverage and target leverage can affect CDS 
spreads. They also use CDS spreads to inversely estimate the over-all average speed of 
adjustment.  
Based on CG’s frame work, speed of adjustment is also an important parameter that should 
affect credit risk. However, previous literature focuses on the estimation of over-all average 
speed of adjustment and have not proposed any methods for estimating firm specific speed of 
adjustment. To my knowledge, by far, the effect of speed of adjustment on credit risk has not 
been studied empirically. We propose the method of estimating firm specific speed of adjustment 
in Chapter 2. To do so, we firstly estimate target capital structure by following Fama and French 
(2002) approach. The firm level speed of adjustment is then estimated by implementing partial 
adjustment model on the historical 15 years’ capital structure time series. Firm specific speed of 
adjustment is estimated on both of book leverage ratio and standardized leverage ratio. These 
speed of adjustment measures are demonstrated to have predictive power on future capital 
structure adjustment behavior in Chapter 2. The firm specific measure of adjustment speed 
proposed in Chapter 2 enables us to test how speed of adjustment affect credit risk empirically. 
Intuitively, firms with large speed of adjustment can timely manage risk of taking leverage 
by either improving the quality of earnings or adjusting leverage ratio. Merton model assumes 
constant debt level, and firm defaults if its asset cannot afford the pre-determined debt level. As 
long as firm can timely manage its debt level, the default probability in Merton’s frame work can 
certainly be reduced. Our first hypothesis is then proposed as: Given other parameters the same, 
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firms with larger speed of adjustment have lower credit risk. We call this as the first-order effect 
of speed of adjustment on Credit risk.  
Speed of adjustment should also affect credit risk through the second order effect. Ideally, if 
one firm has infinite speed of adjustment, then this firm can either always stay at its target capital 
structure, or it occasionally adjusts, but can always timely make the adjustment. An infinite 
speed of adjustment firm should therefore never go default and be regarded as risk-free, 
regardless of how high is its current leverage. In this extreme case, firm’s credit risk is 
independent of its current leverage which is regarded as the most important determinant of credit 
risk in our common sense. This leads to the first of our second-order hypotheses: Credit risk of 
firm with larger speed of adjustment depends less on firm’s current standardized leverage ratio. 
Similarly, while assessing the credit risk of a highly leveraged firm, speed of adjustment is one 
of the most crucial factors determining credit risk since speed of adjustment determines the 
likelihood of whether firm can successfully adjust its leverage down and survive in the future. 
However, speed of adjustment is not an important factor determining credit risk when current 
leverage is very low, since investors may worry less about whether these low leverage firm can 
rebalance their capital structure once they become highly leveraged in the future compared with 
those firms that are already highly leveraged. Our second hypothesis of second order effect is 
therefore: firm’s credit risk is more sensitive to the change of speed of adjustment when firm is 
highly leveraged. 
The linear pricing model of CDS is based on the standardized leverage ratio instead of book 
leverage ratio. As we discussed in Chapter 1, standardized leverage considers the cross-sectional 
difference of underlying business risk and hence provides a fairer measure of risk created by 
leverage. The base linear pricing model regresses credit spreads on standardized leverage, target 
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standardized leverage and other credit risk factors proposed in Altman Z-score (Altman (1968)) 
cross-sectionally. The effect of speed of adjustment is tested by including speed measure into the 
base Credit Spreads linear pricing model. Empirical results strongly support the first-order effect 
by showing significant negative coefficient on speed of adjustment for both book leverage and 
standardized leverage. For testing the second order effect of speed of adjustment, we firstly 
estimate the surface of Credit Spreads on the base of standardized leverage and speed of 
adjustment. The estimated 3-D surface well summarizes the second order effects of speed of 
adjustment on credit risk. In order to control for the full list of variables while testing the second 
order effect, we also implement the Credit Spreads base linear pricing model locally on speed of 
adjustment measures and standardized leverage. The second order effects are supported by our 
empirical results. 
Remaining of Chapter 3 is organized as below: Section 3.2 summarizes collection of data 
and shows summary statistics of key variables which are new in Chapter 3. Section 3.3 discusses 
the hypotheses propositions. Section 3.4 reports the results of first-order effect test. Section 3.5 
reports the results for second-order effect tests. Section 3.6 concludes Chapter 3. 
 
3.2 Data Collection and Summary Statistics 
The sample for the estimation of target capital structure and speed of adjustment is drawn 
from Annual COMPUSTAT database. Stock data is collected from CRSP daily file. Credit 
Spreads are measured as credit default swap spreads. Credit Spreads are priced on the quarterly 
frequency, where firm features are collected from quarterly COMPUSTAT database. To reduce 
the effects of extreme value and outliers, key explanatory variables of Credit Spreads are 
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trimmed at one percent level on both sides. Firms with historical minimum book asset or annual 
sales lower than one million are excluded from our initial sample. Observations with Credit 
Spreads (Maturity of 1-year and 5-year) larger than 10,000 basis points are excluded from the 
sample. Summary statistics for Credit Spreads and key variables are displayed in Table 3.1. 
To avoid looking forward bias, following Bai and Wu (2015), we employ 55 days rule 
while merging COMPUSTAT file to daily market data file CRSP and daily Credit Spreads files. 
The fiscal earnings announcement can be made 45 days after the end of each fiscal year or fiscal 
quarter. Our 55 days rules can guarantee that fundamental variables are used after being released. 
Estimation of target capital structure and speed of adjustment do not require any future 
information beyond the time point of estimation. 
 
3.3 Hypotheses  
The effects of speed of adjustment on credit risk can be implied from CG’s frame work. 
Suppose X denotes firm’s capital structure measure (either logarithm book leverage ratio from 
CG (2001) or standardized leverage ratio). Trade off theory believes that firm would choose the 
capital structure that maximizes firm’s value that balances out the benefits and costs of debt 
financing. Based on Trade-off theory and partial adjustment model, CG (2001) models firm’s 
capital structure as: 
 𝑑𝑋𝑡+1 = 𝑠(𝑋
∗ − 𝑋𝑡)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑑𝑊𝑡 (31) 
The form of the above CG process is exactly the same as partial adjustment model in 
Capital structure literature. s stands for the speed of adjustment in general. So, 𝑠 = 𝜆 if X denotes 
book leverage ratio, and 𝑠 = 𝜅 if X stands for standardized leverage. 𝑋∗ denotes the constant 
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target capital structure. 𝑊𝑡 stands for Wiener process. To focus on the main spirit of CG’s frame 
work, we simplify CG’s analytical formula by assuming default event is independent of the path 
of X, and firm can only default at the maturity T (same as Merton’s assumption). Process of 
Equation (31) yields the distribution density function of 𝑋𝑇 as below, where T stands for any 
arbitrary maturity date. 
 𝑋(𝑇) ∼ 𝑁(𝑋𝑡𝑒
−𝑠𝜏 + 𝑋∗ ⋅ (1 − 𝑒−𝑠𝜏) ,
𝜎2
2𝑠
(1 − 𝑒−2𝑠𝜏)) (32) 
𝜏 = 𝑇 − 𝑡 measures the length of time (time to maturity). 𝑋𝑡 denotes the initial capital 
structure at time t. In the above distribution, N(.) stands for normal distribution with expected 
value of 𝑋𝑡𝑒
−𝑠𝜏 + 𝑋∗ ⋅ (1 − 𝑒−𝑠𝜏) and variance of 
𝜎2
2𝑠
(1 − 𝑒−2𝑠𝜏). Following previous studies’ 
assumption, firm will default when its leverage ratio goes above one which is equivalent as X=0. 
Implications of determinants of credit risk can be drawn from equation (32). As what Elkamhi, 
Pungaliya and Vijh (2014) argues, what matters for credit risk is the expected capital structure. 
Higher expected leverage generates higher credit risk. Higher initial leverage 𝑋𝑡 yields higher 
expected leverage at the maturity and therefore generates larger credit risk. Higher target capital 
structure 𝑋∗also leads to larger credit risk by generating higher expected leverage at the maturity. 
These two implications have been empirically tested by previous studies (Flannery, Nikolova 
and Öztekin (2012)). Both of current capital structure and target capital structure affect credit 
risk through the channel of affecting the expected capital structure at the maturity. Recall that the 
probability of default equals to the area under the density function (32) for 𝑋𝑇 > 1. The 
probability of  𝑋𝑇 > 1 not only depends on the mean of the distribution (the larger the 
distribution mean, the higher probability of default), but also depends on the distribution 
variance. Equation (32) shows that, variance is a decrease function of speed of adjustment. 
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Larger speed of adjustment generates smaller variance of future capital structure distribution and 
hence yields lower probability of default. 
The implications of how speed of adjustment should affect credit risk based on CG’s frame 
work is consistent with our intuition. Intuitively, large speed of adjustment means firm can 
timely manage their debt level. Strong debt management ability can reduce firm’s credit risk. 
Ideally, firm with infinite speed of adjustment should never default. In equation (32), infinite 
speed of adjustment leads to zero variance and hence zero probability to have 𝑋𝑇 > 0 (unless 
𝑋∗ > 0). Our first order hypothesis of how speed of adjustment affects credit risk is therefore 
proposed as: 
1st Order Effect Hypothesis: Given other conditions unchanged, larger speed of 
adjustment reduces firm’s probability of default. 
Second order effects of speed of adjustment on credit risk are also important. On one hand, 
speed of adjustment may affect the importance of standardized leverage on affecting credit risk. 
If a firm’s speed of adjustment is infinite, then this firm’s credit risk should be independent of its 
standardized leverage. Mathematically, the smaller the variance of the distribution, the flatter and 
smaller the density function at the range of [0, +∞], which makes default probability less 
sensitive to the change of expected leverage. Therefore, the larger the speed of adjustment, the 
less important of standardized leverage on affecting firms’ credit risk. On the other hand, the 
sensitivity of credit risk to the change of speed of adjustment is affected by standardized 
leverage. Highly leveraged firm’s credit risk is more sensitive to the change of speed of 
adjustment. Since for those dying firms, speed of adjustment is one of the crucial factors 
determining whether they can successfully decrease their leverage and eventually survive. Low 
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debt firm’s credit risk is less sensitive to the change of speed of adjustment. Hypotheses of the 
second order effect are proposed as: 
2nd Order Effect Hypotheses: 
1) Credit risk depends more on firm’s standardized leverage if speed of adjustment is 
smaller 
2) Credit risk depends more on speed of adjustment for higher leveraged firms  
Second order effect of speed of adjustment on credit risk can be summarized mathematically as 
𝜕2𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝑠𝜕𝑋
< 0. Both of 1st order effect and 2nd order effect can be mathematically derived based on 
CG’s mean reverting leverage frame work. This Chapter focuses on the empirical results and we 
omit the mathematical derivation of these hypotheses. 
 
3.4 Test of First Order Effect 
This section demonstrates the results of the first order effect tests. The detail procedures of 
estimating firm specific speed of adjustment are discussed in Chapter 2. These estimators of firm 
specific speed of adjustment are shown to have predictive power on future capital structure 
adjustment behavior. Figure 3.1 shows the scatter plot of the univariate relation (cross-sectional 
relation) between logarithm of Credit Spreads and firm specific speed estimators (𝜅 and 𝜆) at 
quarter 4 of year 2008 and 2012. This univariate test shows that Credit Spreads decrease with 
speed of adjustment without controlling for other variables. 
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We then implement cross-sectional regression analysis to further show how speed of 
adjustment affects credit risk by including control variables. The regression equations are formed 
as below: 
       𝐿𝐶𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ⋅ 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡 + 𝛼2 ⋅ 𝑇𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡+1 + 𝛽 ⋅ 𝑠 + 𝑋𝑡 ⋅ 𝛾 + 𝜔𝑡 (33) 
 𝐶𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ⋅ 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡 + 𝛼2 ⋅ 𝑇𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑡+1 + 𝛽 ⋅ 𝑠 + 𝑋𝑡 ⋅ 𝛾 + 𝜔𝑡 (34) 
Where CS stands for Credit Spreads and LCS denotes the logarithm of Credit Spreads. 
Variable s stands for speed of adjustment estimates.  SDL denotes standardized leverage ratio. 
TSDL denotes target standardized leverage ratio calculated by Fama and French (2002) 
approach. X includes all variables from Altman Z-score except for leverage ratio. We exclude 
leverage ratio since SDL is the substitute of leverage ratio in credit risk model. X includes 
logarithm of book asset value, investment, profitability and liquidity. We use standardized 
leverage ratio instead of book leverage ratio because SDL considers the variations of underlying 
business risk and can explain credit risk better than book leverage. Replacing SDL by L in 
Equation (33) and Equation (34) does not affect our results. Equation (33) and Equation (34) are 
implemented cross-sectionally for Credit Spreads of credit default swap contracts with maturity 
of one-year and five-year separately. Coefficient of speed of adjustment is expected to have 
negative sign which means larger speed of adjustment can reduce firm’s credit risk. 
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 report the results of Equation (33) and Equation (34). The 
coefficients of SDL and TSDL are positive and significant for all Columns of both tables. This is 
consistent with implications of CG’s frame work. Higher standardized leverage and higher target 
standardized leverage generate higher expected standardized leverage and hence increase firm’s 
credit risk. The coefficients of speed of adjustment for book leverage and standardized leverage 
are significant negative for all columns of Table 3.2 and Table 3.3. These results are consistent 
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with the first order effect hypothesis that larger speed of adjustment reduces firm’s credit risk. 
The coefficient of speed of adjustment is significant economically. If the speed of standardized 
leverage (𝜅) increases by one standard deviation (0.279), the corresponding Credit Spreads of 5-
year credit default swaps contracts will decrease by 24 basis points. If firm’s speed of 
standardized leverage (𝜅) increases from zero to one, then the corresponding firm’s Credit 
Spreads of 5-year contracts will on average decrease by 86 basis points. Similarly, increase of 
one standard deviation on speed of book leverage (𝜆) can reduce Credit Spreads by 17 basis 
points. 
As we discussed in Chapter 2, our estimates of firm specific speed of adjustment measures 
the firm level historical mean speed of adjustment which more likely captures the firm features 
that are stable over time. We therefore expect the estimates of firm specific speed to have 
persistent effect on Credit Spreads. To test on the persistency of firm specific speed, we 
implement the same regressions as Equation (33) and Equation (34) by replacing speed measure 
by 4-year lag speed measure. By taking 4-year lag of speed measure, short term factors that may 
affect the speed estimates and Credit Spreads simultaneously are excluded. Table 3.4 reports the 
results of using lag 4-year speed of adjustment estimates. Coefficients of all lag speed measures 
are negative and significant. The statistical and economical significances for lag 4-year speed 
measures remains quite strong. The significance of lag 4-year speed measure indicates that the 
effects of firm specific speed on Credit Spreads are persistent and are driven by firm features that 
are stable over time. 
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3.5 Test of The Second Order Effect 
Section 3.4 shows the effect of speed of adjustment on credit spreads is statistically and 
economically significant. However, the effect of firm specific speed on Credit Spreads is not 
uniform. The second order hypotheses suggest that, the effect of speed of adjustment is more 
prominent when the firm is highly leveraged and the effect of standardized leverage would 
become less important when speed of adjustment is large. We test the second order effect by two 
methods. For the first method, we estimate the 3-D surface of Credit Spreads (credit default 
swaps with maturity of 5 years) on standardized leverage and speed of adjustment (both of 𝜅 and 
𝜆). The second order effect can be presented clearly by the surface plot. The drawback of surface 
analysis is, we cannot control for other variables. So, for the second method, we implement 
weighted least square regression locally at each quantile of standardized leverage and speed of 
adjustment which allow us to include control variables.  
3.5.1 Surface Estimation 
The purpose of surface method is to form a perfect control between speed of adjustment and 
standardized leverage. Speed of adjustment and standardized leverage ratio are correlated. High 
speed firms are less likely to have extreme value of capital structure. Surface method can 
guarantee that the effect of speed of adjustment on credit risk is not because of its correlation 
with standardized leverage.  Figure 3.2 shows the scatter plot of speed of adjustment and 
standardized leverage (blue dots), and the base used for surface estimation (lattice in red dashed 
lines). The upper figure of Figure 3.2 displays the scatter plot of 𝜅 and SDL. The bottom figure 
of Figure 3.2 displays the scatter plot of 𝜆 and SDL . The coordinates of speed of adjustment and 
standardized leverage are not uniformly distributed. To avoid extrapolating surface estimation, 
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the estimated surface cannot cover all observations. The surface is estimated only on the area 
with sufficient observations of speed and standardized leverage. We form 60 portfolios on speed 
of adjustment (𝜅 and 𝜆) and then standardized leverage (Observations are sorted into 6 groups 
and 10 groups by speed of adjustment and standardized leverage independently). For each 
portfolio, we calculate the mean value of speed of adjustment and the mean value of standardized 
leverage. The 6 by 10 lattices (red dashed lines) in Figure 3.2 are constructed by connecting the 
mean value of speed of adjustment and mean value of standardized leverage of each portfolio. 
There are enough observations under the area covered by the lattice. The surfaces of Credit 
Spreads on speed of adjustment and standardized leverage are then estimated only on the area 
covered by the lattices. 
For each node on the lattice, we calculate the corresponding local weighted average Credit 
Spreads. We denote each node as (𝑖, 𝑗). The local weighted average Credit Spreads on node (𝑖, 𝑗) 
is calculated as the weighted sum of all observed Credit Spreads. The weight for k’s observation 
is defined as: 
 𝑤𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 = 𝑓([𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑘, 𝑠𝑘], [𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   , 𝑠?̅?], [ℎ𝑖 , ℎ𝑗]) (35) 
In equation (35), f(.) denotes bi-variate normal density function with the density mean of 
mean standardized leverage and mean speed of adjustment of group (node) (i , j) and standard 
deviation of  ℎ𝑖 and ℎ𝑗 . Covariance of the above bi-normal distribution is assumed as zero. The 










The surface is then estimated by calculating the local weighted average Credit Spreads for 
each node on the lattice. Figure 3.3 displays the estimated surface of Credit Spreads (5-year 
credit default swaps) on speed of adjustment of standardized leverage (𝜅) and standardized 
leverage. Over-all, Credit Spreads increase with standardized leverage and decrease with speed 
of adjustment. The second order effect can be clearly observed in the 3-D surface. Credit Spreads 
depend much less on the change of standardized leverage when speed of adjustment is large. 
Table 3.5 reports the detail estimated results of Figure 3.3. When 𝜅 is small (first row of each 
panel), standardized leverage increase from low (about -4.85) to high (about -0.45), the Credit 
Spreads increase from 51 basis points to 625 basis points on average, which is a 574 basis points 
increase. However, when 𝜅 is large (sixth row of each panel), standardized leverage increases 
from low to high, the Credit Spreads increase from 38 basis points to 324 basis points, which is a 
286 basis points increase, much less than the 574 basis points increase for low speed case. 
Similarly, the surface also supports the hypothesis that, credit risk depends more on speed of 
adjustment when standardized leverage is high. When standardized leverage is low (first column 
of each panel), 𝜅 increases from small (about 6%) to large (about 68%), corresponding Credit 
Spreads decrease from 51 basis points to 38 basis points, which is a 13 basis points decrease. 
When standardized leverage is high (last column of each panel), 𝜅 increases from small to large, 
the corresponding Credit Spreads decrease from 625 basis points to 324 basis points, which is a 
301 basis points decrease. Similar results can be observed by using speed of adjustment 
estimated on book leverage (𝜆). Table 3.6 reports the detail results of surface estimation of Credit 
Spreads on standardized leverage and (𝜆). The second order effect of 𝜆 is less significant 
economically than 𝜅, but remains important.  
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The most important advantage of surface analysis is: surface estimation can form a perfect 
control between speed of adjustment and standardized leverage. Capital structure and speed of 
adjustment are correlated since large speed firms are less likely to have extreme value of capital 
structure. Along each row of Table 3.5 and Table 3.6, speed of adjustment is held as constant. 
Variations of Credit Spreads along each row cannot be caused by variations of speed of 
adjustment. Similarly, the standardized leverage along each column remains constant. The 
variations of Credit Spreads are therefore more likely to be caused by the variations of speed of 
adjustment. This perfect control cannot be achieved by regression analysis. However, the 
drawback of surface analysis is obvious. Surface analysis cannot control for other important 
variables that are identified to affect credit risk. To accommodate this issue, we implement local 
weighted least square regression analysis in next subsection. 
3.5.2 Local Regression Analysis  
In order to demonstrate the existence of second order effect by including other control 
variables, we implement WLS regression locally on each quantile of standardized leverage and 
speed of adjustment. To test the first hypothesis of second order effect that credit risk depends 
more on speed of adjustment when firm’s leverage is high, we implement the following WLS 
regression locally on every percentile of standardized leverage: 
 𝐶𝑆5 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ⋅ 𝑆𝐷𝐿 + 𝛾 ⋅ 𝑠 + 𝜃 ⋅ 𝑋 + 𝜖 (37) 
Speed measure s denotes speed of adjustment (𝜅 and 𝜆). Control variable X includes firm 
size, investment, liquidity and profitability. At each quantile of standardized leverage, the weight 
of each observations is constructed as the local kernel with bandwidth of 0.4 (the choice of 
bandwidth is arbitrary. Alternative bandwidth does not affect our main results). We expect to 
72 
 
observe the coefficient of speed of adjustment (𝛾) becomes more negative as the quantile of 
standardized leverage increases from low to high. 
Figure 3.4 shows the change of 𝛾 by changing the quantile of standardized leverage. 
Horizontal axis denotes the corresponding value of standardized leverage. Vertical axis denotes 
the corresponding 𝛾 estimation of equation (37) for that particular quantile of standardized 
leverage. Clearly, the coefficient of speed of adjustment decreases as standardized leverage 
increases firm specific speed estimates (𝜅 and 𝜆). When standardized leverage equals zero, the 
corresponding local coefficient of speed of adjustment is as negative as -0.042 (420 basis points).  
To test on the second hypothesis of second order effect that credit risk depends less on 
standardized leverage when speed of adjustment is large, we implement the same WLS 
regression (37) on each quantile of speed of adjustment. Figure 3.5 reports how the coefficient of 
standardized leverage (𝛽) changes with the speed of adjustment (𝜅 and 𝜆). The weight of the 
WLS regression is formed as the local kernel on each quantile of speed of adjustment with 
bandwidth of 0.15. The horizontal axis denotes the corresponding speed of adjustment. The 
vertical axis stands for the local estimation of coefficient of standardized leverage (𝛽) on each 
quantile of speed. Clearly, as speed of adjustment increases, the coefficient of standardized 
leverage (𝛽) decreases. This is consistent with our second order effect hypothesis. 
 
3.6 Conclusion of Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 shows how speed of adjustment affects firm’s credit risk measured as Credit 
Spreads of credit default swaps. To my knowledge, we are the first to empirically test how speed 
of adjustment affects credit risk. Generally, we observe first order effect and second order effect 
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of speed of adjustment on credit risk. For the first order effect, firm’s credit risk decreases with 
speed of adjustment. Larger speed of adjustment stands for stronger ability to manage capital 
structure which leads to lower credit risk. For the second order effect, we find that firm’s credit 
risk depends less on firm’s standardized leverage when speed of adjustment is large. Similarly, 
we find the effect of speed of adjustment on credit risk is stronger when firm is highly leveraged.  
















Table 3. 1  Summary Statistics 
  Mean St.Dev. Min Max Obs 
𝐶𝑆1 0.0097 0.0332 0.0002 0.9769 8601 
𝐶𝑆5 0.0181 0.0315 0.0005 0.8682 9463 
𝐿𝐶𝑆1 -5.723 1.319 -8.776 -0.023 8601 
𝐿𝐶𝑆5 -4.575 1.002 -7.631 -0.141 9463 
𝜅 0.330 0.279 -0.334 1.155 9463 
𝜆 0.223 0.199 -0.136 0.954 9463 
Firm Size 8.270 0.986 5.077 10.350 9463 
Investment 0.226 0.356 -2.798 0.928 9463 
ProfitabilitQ 0.022 0.027 -0.442 0.124 9463 
















Table 3. 2  First Order Effect Test (𝜿) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 𝐿𝐶𝑆1 𝐿𝐶𝑆5 𝐶𝑆1 𝐶𝑆5 
SDL 0.429 0.394 0.00561 0.00812 
 (18.89) (28.19) (5.30) (10.83) 
     
TSDL 0.167 0.235 0.00242 0.00535 
 (2.72) (5.83) (1.62) (2.85) 
     
𝜅 -0.275 -0.156 -0.00746 -0.00856 
 (-10.79) (-6.95) (-5.22) (-5.98) 
     
Firm Size -0.272 -0.172 -0.00171 -0.00192 
 (-8.13) (-8.91) (-3.92) (-3.95) 
     
Investment -0.528 -0.566 -0.0113 -0.0175 
 (-10.11) (-14.96) (-4.04) (-7.40) 
     
Profitability -9.301 -5.897 -0.115 -0.113 
 (-8.56) (-10.84) (-4.75) (-9.62) 
     
Liquidity -0.627 -0.455 -0.0129 -0.0112 
 (-10.35) (-11.16) (-3.32) (-3.47) 
     
Constant -1.575 -1.249 0.0492 0.0727 
 (-12.46) (-10.98) (7.61) (16.46) 
N 8675 9539 8675 9539 






           




Table 3. 3  First Order Effect Test (𝝀) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 𝐿𝐶𝑆1 𝐿𝐶𝑆5 𝐶𝑆1 𝐶𝑆5 
SDL 0.442 0.406 0.00664 0.00933 
 (17.59) (24.29) (4.58) (7.93) 
     
TSDL 0.195 0.244 0.00398 0.00617 
 (2.92) (5.21) (1.79) (2.63) 
     
𝜆 -0.431 -0.320 -0.00672 -0.00847 
 (-10.49) (-12.61) (-5.66) (-7.83) 
     
Firm Size -0.264 -0.172 -0.00135 -0.00168 
 (-7.77) (-8.64) (-2.60) (-3.04) 
     
Investment -0.415 -0.449 -0.00579 -0.0113 
 (-7.92) (-10.57) (-8.44) (-12.69) 
     
Profitability -9.570 -6.263 -0.119 -0.124 
 (-9.08) (-11.94) (-5.06) (-10.34) 
     
Liquidity -0.586 -0.435 -0.0116 -0.00994 
 (-8.01) (-9.42) (-2.92) (-3.15) 
     
Constant -1.550 -1.205 0.0476 0.0715 
 (-12.53) (-10.83) (7.95) (18.30) 
N 8918 9822 8918 9822 
R2 0.549 0.626 0.302 0.475 
  









Table 3. 4  First Order Effect Test: Using Lag of Firm Specific Speed Measure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 lcs5 lcs5 spread - 5y spread - 5y 
SDL 0.386 0.378 0.00881 0.00829 
 (25.40) (23.18) (11.10) (11.44) 
     
TSDL 0.104 0.133 0.00149 0.00250 
 (3.81) (4.40) (2.13) (2.72) 
     
𝐿4. 𝜅  -0.0621  -0.00364 
  (-2.14)  (-5.05) 
     
𝐿4. 𝜆 -0.222  -0.00726  
 (-5.29)  (-4.59)  
     
Firm Size -0.204 -0.202 -0.00313 -0.00332 
 (-12.94) (-12.05) (-10.60) (-11.27) 
     
Investment -0.386 -0.439 -0.0141 -0.0165 
 (-10.91) (-11.60) (-9.41) (-10.21) 
     
Profitability -5.561 -5.187 -0.132 -0.118 
 (-9.59) (-9.54) (-5.86) (-5.38) 
     
Liquidity -0.432 -0.518 -0.0121 -0.0157 
 (-6.09) (-8.18) (-3.40) (-4.48) 
     
Constant -1.263 -1.260 0.0760 0.0781 
 (-8.54) (-7.89) (24.79) (29.68) 
N 5046 4883 5046 4883 










Table 3. 5  Results of Credit Spreads Surface Estimation (𝜿) 
  low SDL 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High SDL 
  Panel A: Weighted Average CS 
Small kappa 51 67 65 90 110 153 182 247 398 625 
2 51 66 67 85 114 151 188 252 362 549 
3 52 67 68 83 112 143 183 244 328 478 
4 52 68 70 83 109 131 173 227 291 417 
5 49 67 72 87 104 118 156 200 249 363 
Large kappa 38 64 74 89 93 120 129 155 202 324 
  Panel B: Weighted Average SDL 
Small kappa -4.846 -4.025 -3.506 -3.091 -2.697 -2.344 -1.957 -1.582 -1.151 -0.446 
2 -4.842 -4.027 -3.504 -3.091 -2.701 -2.344 -1.959 -1.581 -1.151 -0.450 
3 -4.842 -4.027 -3.504 -3.089 -2.704 -2.343 -1.960 -1.580 -1.152 -0.453 
4 -4.845 -4.028 -3.505 -3.087 -2.706 -2.343 -1.961 -1.580 -1.153 -0.455 
5 -4.853 -4.030 -3.508 -3.084 -2.706 -2.343 -1.961 -1.580 -1.152 -0.455 
Large kappa -4.863 -4.038 -3.508 -3.084 -2.699 -2.344 -1.962 -1.584 -1.144 -0.445 
  Panel C: Weighted Average kappa 
Small kappa 0.042 0.063 0.081 0.063 0.083 0.083 0.085 0.069 0.048 0.032 
2 0.179 0.188 0.184 0.187 0.195 0.182 0.186 0.169 0.149 0.144 
3 0.266 0.265 0.260 0.268 0.267 0.254 0.253 0.242 0.222 0.220 
4 0.348 0.348 0.350 0.348 0.344 0.341 0.331 0.325 0.310 0.300 
5 0.451 0.457 0.468 0.455 0.447 0.461 0.445 0.436 0.437 0.429 












Table 3. 6 Results of Credit Spreads Surface Estimation (𝝀) 
  Panel A: Weighted Average CS 
Small lambda 52 70 70 89 118 143 179 247 342 573 
2 52 69 70 89 115 141 173 236 331 529 
3 53 69 70 88 111 138 167 225 320 490 
4 52 68 71 88 106 136 160 213 308 455 
5 48 65 72 87 100 133 154 204 295 426 
Large Lambda 41 59 71 88 92 114 154 203 296 430 
  Panel B: Weighted Average SDL 
Small lambda -4.850 -4.028 -3.507 -3.086 -2.701 -2.343 -1.964 -1.582 -1.150 -0.447 
2 -4.850 -4.028 -3.505 -3.087 -2.700 -2.343 -1.963 -1.582 -1.149 -0.447 
3 -4.850 -4.029 -3.504 -3.087 -2.698 -2.344 -1.962 -1.582 -1.147 -0.448 
4 -4.850 -4.030 -3.503 -3.087 -2.698 -2.345 -1.961 -1.582 -1.146 -0.449 
5 -4.848 -4.032 -3.504 -3.088 -2.700 -2.345 -1.958 -1.581 -1.148 -0.452 
Large Lambda -4.851 -4.032 -3.507 -3.092 -2.708 -2.345 -1.956 -1.580 -1.157 -0.451 
  Panel C: Weighted Average lambda 
Small lambda 0.058 0.070 0.075 0.084 0.074 0.074 0.082 0.073 0.071 0.076 
2 0.083 0.098 0.104 0.111 0.105 0.103 0.111 0.106 0.101 0.108 
3 0.118 0.131 0.138 0.143 0.142 0.139 0.146 0.144 0.136 0.144 
4 0.181 0.183 0.188 0.193 0.200 0.193 0.202 0.201 0.189 0.196 
5 0.305 0.282 0.277 0.286 0.294 0.281 0.301 0.294 0.279 0.281 












Figure 3. 1  Scatter Plot of Credit Spreads on Firm Specific Speed of Adjustment 
Scatter plot of logarithm CDS spreads with 5-year maturity on speed of adjustment measured as 











Figure 3. 2  Scatter Plot of Speed of Adjustment and Standardized Leverage 
Scatter plot of SDL and speed of adjustment (kappa and lambda) is displayed by the blue dots which 
shows the distribution of the base of 3-D surface of credit spreads on SDL (Standardized Leverage Ratio) 
and speed of adjustment. The lattice in red dashed lines denotes the selected area that the surface to be 
estimated on. The lattice is constructed by ranking SDL and speed of adjustment independently into ten 
and six groups respectively. Each cross of the lattice is located by taking the mean value of each SDL 







Figure 3. 3 Estimated Surface of Credit Spreads On Firm Specific Speed of adjustment and 
Standardized Leverage (𝜿) 
This figure shows estimated surface of credit spreads on SDL and kappa. The surface is estimated on 
the base marked as dashed red lattice in Figure 3.2 (the upper figure). Vertical axis denotes CDS spreads 
with maturity of 5 years. X axis stands for standardized leverage (SDL) and Y axis denotes speed of 
adjustment estimated on standardized leverage ratio. The surface is estimated by taking the local weighted 














Figure 3. 4  Local Weighted Least Square Regression Along Standardized Leverage 
Quantiles 
Local weighted least square regression of equation: 𝐶𝑆5 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ⋅ 𝑆𝐷𝐿 + 𝛾 ⋅ 𝑠 + 𝜃 ⋅ 𝑋 + 𝜖𝑡. At each 
local percentile of SDL, the weight of the regression is constructed by the normal kernel of bandwidth of 
0.4. This figure shows the estimated gamma on each quantile of SDL. The red dashed line denotes gamma 












Figure 3. 5  Local Weighted Least Square Regression Along Firm Specific Speed Measure 
Quantiles 
Local weighted least square regression of equation: 𝐶𝑆5 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ⋅ 𝑆𝐷𝐿 + 𝜃 ⋅ 𝑋 + 𝜖𝑡. At each local 
percentile of speed of adjustment (kappa and lambda), the weight of the regression is constructed by the 
normal kernel of bandwidth of 0.2. This figure shows the estimated beta on each quantile of speed of 
adjustment. The red dashed line denotes beta estimation for using kappa while the blue line denotes beta 
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